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I. This paper was delivered as the r995 Sidney W. Mintz Lecture to the Department of Anthropology of The Johns Hopkins Univer sity on November 20, 1995. I acknowledge with gratitude the conTracing the dynamic components of power in a world where people must conduct their daily lives within larger systems presents the formidable task of repre senting the complexities of personal experience with out losing sight of connections. World conditions have quickened anthropological interest in understanding particular peoples at junctures of local and global his tory in order to locate populations in larger currents or to trace larger currents in local places. Ethnohistorical study of connections usually requires the examination of unequal relations, and this in tum necessitates the identification of controlling processes-the mecha nisms by which ideas take hold and become institu tional in relation to power. 2 The various research strate· gies involve combinations of ethnographic, historical, and critical approaches. Ethnography gets to the heart of control and why it is so difficult to perceive and to study, history connects us to the processes that interact with experience, and the reflexive approach leads us to analytical tools that may themselves be hegemonic or ideologically tainted-for example, ideas about control, culture, and the anthropologist on home ground.
Sidney Mintz in his classic work on sugar and power [I9851 was keenly aware of implicit power and the way in which lithe controllers of society" use it to constrain the free choice of consumers. The creation of new con sumption needs is part of the staging of demands for in dustrial products and services. Mintz identified the con trollers as planters, bankers, slavers, bureaucrats, shippers, and others. For Michel Foucault ('967:921, in contrast, power was "not a group of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citi zens" but a force that permeated all realms of social life, with no real center and no one employing power tactics. Drawing on long-term fieldwork as well as archival re search, Mintz calls attention to the internalization of codes of behavior by means of which institutional structures transform social relations and consumption pattems. 3 His work indicates that to trace the dynamics tributions of the many colleagues and students who have over the years discussed the ideas in this paper and forged ahead in their own studies of control. In particular, I thank S. Ervin-Tripp, R.
Gonzalez, E. Hertz, R. Kliger, J. Martin, J. Qu, and R. Stryker for their contributions in the preparation of this paper. 2. Elic Wolf's book Europe and the People Without History (1982) most significantly shaped my understanding of the need to erase the boundaries between Western and non-Western history, to make connections that had for too long been absent from earlier efforts to understand diffusion or massive areal conquests. Although Wolf's book inspired me to document and explain the spread of dominant legal models, Sidney MintZ'S Sweetness and Power (1985) , which followed shortly after, coincided with my work on the anthropology of life in the United States seen through the prism of controlling processes and helped ground that work. 3· Mintz was also aware of acts of resistance. For example, his Worker in the Cane (1960) is the biography of a Puerto Rican with deep involvements in union and political affairS, a worker inter ested in justice who by virtue of his acts was "swept out of average anonymity" (Salz 1961: 106-7) ; his actions placed him "among the doers and shakers rather than among the done-to and shaken aver age men," a man "who acts within the limited scope at his disposal and enlarges it, and who is acted upon by the set patterns and cir cumstances of his existence." 7" of power we must employ more than knowledge of power structures, controllers, and the repudiation of agency or its glorification as resistance. For me the con cept of controlling processes is useful because it allows the incorporation of the full panoply of key concepts ideology, hegemony, social and cultural control-in the study of both invisible and visible aspects of power working vertically through ideas and institutions (Nader 1980a) . In this lecture honoring Mintz's work, I use three ethnographic accounts to trace how and why power is acquired, used, maintained, or lost. These ex· amples employ a contextualized description of pro cesses and dynamics to trace the flow of power and so reveal something about the manner in which cultural ideas-ideas about what it is to be civilized, about stan· dardized bodies, and abour rbe place and meaning of sci ence-are transformed." In that sense this paper is about a methodology for studying power.
The term "controlling processes" refers to the trans formative nature of central ideas such as coercive har mony that emanate from institutions operating as dy namic components of power. Although the study of controlling processes looks at how central dogmas are made and how they work in multiple sites (often ar rayed vertically), it also focuses our attention on micro processeSj that is, it is the study of how individuals and groups are influenced and persuaded to participate in their own domination OI, alternatively, to resist it, sometimes disrupting domination or putting the sys tem in reverse (Nader 1994, 19960) . Because power moves, it is unstable, and sometimes people achieve power rather than being deprived of it. Cumulative tin kering can be a two·way process ISeott 1990) or double edged.
My task here is twofold. First, 1present ethnographic accounts ro show how control is redistributed by profes sions-in law by coercive harmony, in medicine by an ideology of choice, in museology by demystification.' 4. The Controlling Process Project has been in progress at the Uni versity of California, Berkeley, since the early 19800. A portion of this work has been published in two issues of the Kroeber Anthro pological Papers as Essays on Controlling Processes (Nader 1994 (Nader , 1996a . Two of the works mentioned here, by Linda Coco and So phia Vackimes, were based on undergraduate theses. They are in the case of Coco a result of three years of fieldwork and writing and in the case of Vackimes of a year of field and documentary reo search. Both theses are on file in the university's George and Mary Foster Anthropology Library. The longest project on controlling processes is discussed in the first example dealing with harmony ideology, a project that had its inception in 1957. 5. Two books have been critical to my thinking on the role of pro fessions in fashioning controlling processes. Mary Furner's Advo cacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of Ameri· can Social Science. 1865-1905 (r9751 focuses on economics in the 1880s, when profesSIOnals were struggling with social questions as sociated with industrialization. Academic freedom cases of the r880s and 1890S exposed the means of establishing mtemal disci pline and acceptable behavior. Corrine Lathrop Cilb's Hidden Hier archies: The ProfesSIons and Government 11966) is the first history of the private government of American professions, including med icine, dentistry, nursing, law, education, architecture, the various SCiences, and engmeering. Glib compares the American professions to medieval guilds and examines the ways in which they control and discipline their members.
These three ethnographic examples show how control· ling processes ale manufactured, how they work ro shift standards of taste or value, and how they travel through a multiplicity of discourses, sites, and practices. The ac counts illustrate what has been nonnalized, unearthing invisible structures and recognizing frequent departures from reality, to document not only how cultures are in vented but how invented cultures work. The study of controlling processes is at some level a response to Mintz's call for an "anthropology of everyday life,II a re sponse that brings political and economic issues more prominently into present-day anthropology, whose methodology is rooted in fieldwork. This call for an Ilanthropology of everyday life" makes necessary my second task-to examine why it is difficult for U.S. an thropologists to examine controlling processes in the United States. As Mintz (r9961 reminds us, anthropolo gists (just like other citizens' are conditioned by tbeiI society. This is indicated in the following three exam ples/ which take us through institutions as varied as Christian missions, cosmetics corporations, the military-industrial complex, and the bar for ends as varied as pacification, maximization of profits, and the pursuit of symbolic capital.
How Power Works STANDARDIZING EMOTION: COERCIVE HARMONY
Wolf 11982) and Mintz 11985' have traced commodities through developing world systems to construct dy namic examples of European expansion, and their work has motivated some of us to trace the movement of ideas. I began to follow what I called the harmony law model, which encapsulates coercive compromise and consensus as a form of behavior modification I adeI [990) . Over a period of 40 years working in a number of different sites, I came to appreciate why anthropologists underestimate the political and economic use of legal ideologies in the construction or deconstruction of cul ture writ large. As a result of a fine-grained analysis of the harmony law model used in Zapotec courts and an awareness of similar arrangements in international ne gotiation settings, I began to understand that the coer cive power of legal ideologies had been missed by an thropologists caught up in a romantic notion of cultwe.
Research among the mountain Zapotec of Oaxaca, Mexico, from r 957 to r 969 first led me ro distinguish harmony from harmony ideology and then to interpret the use of the harmony law model as a rool of pacifica tion at first contact with Europe. My subsequent field work, not residentially limited and roughly covering the years 1970 to the present, revealed an explosion of alternative dispute resolution in the United States that I also interpreted as pacification by means of harmony ideology and as essentially a response ro the 1960s legal rights and access-ro-justice movemenrs INader 19891. When I shifted my attention to library research on inter national river disputes (Nader 19951 I found these same alternative dispute resolution techniques being em played. In many settings social scientists sought to ex plain conflict while at the same time taking coercive harmony for granted. 6 Although the organization of Zapotec villages is a leg acy of the Spanish crown, villages today remain autono mous to the extent to which they manage to keep peace among themselves and exclude outsiders. Zapotec au tonomy is enhanced in their courts, where images of the external world are built} self-government is articulated} and ideologies are formed. The harmony law model was likely introduced by the crown and its religious mis sions. The Zapotec claim as their own the Spanish prov erb "A bad agreement is better than a good fight./I As I probed} it seemed to me more and more likely that the indigenes, having been thus introduced to the harmony law model} began using it as a tool for restricting the encroachment of external} superordinate power (much as did New England villages of the 18th centuryl by en couraging harmonious rather than contentious behav ior. The Zapotec turned a hegemonic tool into a count· erhegemonic technique of control to keep the state out.
When theorists speak of cultural control as hege monic they are referring not to all culture but to the part that is constructed at one point and spreads much as colonies of people move to or settle in distant lands. As I unpacked theories of control, I turned my attention to classic ethnographies on law in former British colo nies in Africa and then to ethnographies on the Pacific reg'ions of Polynesia and Micronesia} searching for con nections between Christian missionizing and law. The preliminary review was tantalizing, Why was it that an thropologists commonly reponed conciliation among indigenous peoples? The legal historian Martin Cha nock (I985L whose work covers the origin} use} and modern consequences of harmony ideology, revealed early connections between local law and Christian mis sion emphasizing conciliation and compromise through the operation of principles of Euro-Christian harmony ideology.' In 1976 I attended rhe Pound Revisited Con ference in St, Paul, Minnesota,S and began to study how 6. Interestingly, as with Llewellyn and Hoebel's The Cheyenne Way 11941), based on work in the 1930S, rationalization for how well harmony law models work was sought in the anthropological literature lGibbs 1963, Nader r969).ln The Cheyenne Way the pos sibilities for refuting Harvard Law School's legal formalism under the leadership of Langdell were enhanced for Llewellyn, a legal reo alist, by studying a culture that had no written law; experience per force became central. 7. For my purposes Chanock's (1985) synthesis of the data on the missionary presence in what are today Zambia and Malawi from the r830s onward is revealing of the early connection between lo cal law and Christian missions and goes far beyond anything an thropologists had written about by the mid·I980s. Chanock points to the contradiction between African ideology and practice in the pre-and postcolonial periods. He uses the term "missionary jus tice" to call attention to the missionary influence in the construe· tion of African "customary" law as encountered by anthropologists in the century follOWing. 8. The Pound Revisited Conference was held in the same place where Roscoe Pound in r906 delivered his memorable talk to the American Bar Association "The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice." The conference was to be a symbolic vehicle for a serious and comprehensive examination of NADER 
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harmony legal ideologies are constructed in modern nation-states of the Western democratic sort} penetrate institutions of society (schools} hospitals, workplacesL and radiate beyond national borders.
By sheer happenstance} as I was working on these ma terials I began to notice, along with other observers of the U.S. political scene, that Americans had become subdued and apathetic (Nader 1989) . The 1960s had been a time when many social groups in the United States felt encouraged to come forward with their agendas: civil rights} environmental rights, consumer rights, women's rights} Native American rights, and so on. It was a confrontive period marked by sharp cri tiques of law and lawyers in relation to rights, remedies, and the workings of the judicial system and pushed by concerns with rights and justice. Yet in about 25 years the country had moved from central concerns with jus tice to concerns with efficiency, order, and harmony} from public concern with the ethic of right and wrong to an ethic of treatment (Claeson I994) , from courts as a dominant symbol for law use to alternative dispute resolution. How had this shift happened?
Although alternative dispute resolution encompasses programs that are called "informal justice"-that is, justice that focuses on mandatory mediation-this is not the same thing as earlier negotiation and mediation. Mandatory mediation-arbitration (in itself a contradic tion in terms) replaces contention with "peace" and win-win solutions, The language of alternative dispute resolution is heavily psychological rather than legal, and it has attracted strange bedfellows-right-wing pol iticians concerned with the prospect of the success of the rights agendas, left-wing activists concerned with improving the judicial process, religious communities} psychotherapy groups, businesses tired of paying enor mous sums in lawyers' fees} and administrators wishing to facilitate bureaucratic procedures. Dogmas of har mony and consensus appeal to a wide spectrum of polit ical positions from right to left and} because they have deep cultural roots in American society, leave room for instrumental manipulations and more.
Warren Burger, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, played a pivotal role in the alternative dispute resolution movement from his appointment in 1969 un til his retirement in r986. Burger adumbrated a manner of thinking about social relations} structural problems of inequality, and cultural solutions to these problems that foreshadowed a cultural shift with ramifications procedural legal reform to be accomplished by the year 2000. "Cu mulative tinkering" was thought to be a useful strategy, and alter native forms of dispute resolution were suggested to which court business might be diverted. The discourse at this conference ex tolled the virtues of harmony and efficiency. New tribunals would, it was argued, be needed to divert cases generated by the regulated welfare state and the 1960s rights movements. It was the start of the conservative legal revolution of which, at the invitation of Chief Justice Warren Burger, I was a privileged participant observer. Since that time I have pondered the implications of a rhetoric of consensus, homogeneity, and agreement and the contradictions it poses for a society that espouses the idea of the rule of law as a cornerstone of democratic order. far beyond the law. The movement was against the con· tentious and against concerns with root causes and to ward control over the disenfranchised. For the most part the elements of such control were invisible, but they were pervasive. The discourse of alternative dispute res olution was characterized by the use of a restricted lan guage code with fonnulaics following the pattern of assertive rhetoric: broad generalizations, repetition, in vocation of authority and danger, presentation of values as fact and almost no hard data. For the most part the bench and the corporate bar swallowed the chief jus tice's exhortations-an interesting story in itself, since such acceptance would seem to run counter to lawyer self-interest (Nader r9931. Duncan Kennedy (r982) was right: legal training for hierarchy is preparation for be lieving the chief justice. The point of calling attention to the use of the har mony law model is not to valorize an adversarial model but to attempt to understand how and why legal ideolo gies shift from tolerance for controversy to the pursuit of harmony over time and with what consequences (Au erbach r983). Certainly the history of global replace ment of adversarial models by harmony models does not indicate that harmony ideology is benign. On the contrary, during the past three decades harmony ideol ogy has resulted in an invisible redistribution of power. The conditions under which preferences in dispute management are historically "shifting commitments" usually involve power in motion.
Burger's legacy is evident everywhere today. A major purpose of environmental conferences, for example! is to see whether the emphasis can be shifted from a win lose situation to a balance-oF-interest approach. Ameri can Indians on reservations are being persuaded by ne gotia tors from Washington to take nuclear waste as a win-win solution-climbing out of their misery while contributing to their country IOu r9961. Timber activ ists are pressured with consensus meetings. Unions are deluged with quality-conttol plans whereby workers and management can cooperate in harmony (Gonzalez 1996) . Family problems are mediated! and, ironically, in many states such mediation is mandatory /Grillo 1991).10 Ghetto schooll/troublemakers" and leaders are 9. After an invited lecture at Ohio State Law School a law professor challenged my position by asserting that Justice Sandra Day O'Connor had stood in the same place three months earlier saying that people like alternative dispute resolution. I asked him what her evidence was. His answer: "She doesn't need evidence, she's a Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court." 10. In 199r the late Trina Grillo, both law professor and mediator, wrote the first scathing critique of mediation in action. Her work is about how mediation operates as control-control in defining "the problem" and control of speech and expression-and con cludes that mediation is hardly a panacea alternative to an adver sarial system. Grillo's cultural analysis is pointed in her assess ment of formal equality as a destroyer of social context, in her discussion of how by limiting the discussion of fault and the past rights are destroyed, and in her framing of the problems as equal control with unequal responsibility. Important also are her keen observations on the suppression of anger, especially the prohibition of female anger. In addition, she argues that the choice of process is sabotaged by forced engagement. Her article is a profound argu ment against mandatory mediation and In favor of truth in adver taught how to mediate disputes rather than search for justice. In Washington! D.C., there is now a Govern· ment Office of Consensus Conference Planning, and we have elected presidents whose preference for consensus has been widely noted. Carol Greenhouse's Ir986) work has called attention to the Southern roots of Presidents Carter and Clinton and the latter's position on consen sus; her study of a Southern Baptist community in Georgia reveals the cultural roots of an alternative dispute-resolution explosion in which the contempo· rary equation of Euro-American Christianity with har· mony instills law avoidance, law aversion, and the value of consensus-"a strategy that transformed con· flict." Jerold Auerbach (r983J had already pointed to a recurrent dialectic in the United States between har mony and judicial models of law.
Thus, it appears that in the effort to quell the rights movements of the 1960s and to cool Vietnam~war pro tests, harmony became a virtue.
ll Burger argued that to be more "civilized" Americans had to abandon their re liance on the adversarial model. It was by means of such rhetoric that the present-day /ftort-reform" movement was born. Though the general public was largely un aware of it, the plan attracted enough attention to shift public emphasis and empathy away from courts and in jured plaintiffs. A burgeoning dispute-resolution indus try institutionalized the shift from lithe acrimonious" to (Ithe harmonious" through an empirically UTI grounded discourse about the United States as "overliti gious" INader r994). The powerful tend to become ad vantaged by alternative dispute resolution, and coercive harmony can be repressive.
There were critics who challenged the assumptions about a litigation explosion( and studies revealed alter native dispute resolution!s practice of controlling the definition of the problem and the form of its expression! includi.ng the prohibition of anger. In spi.te of empirical challenges to assumptions and assertions, alternative dispute resolution continued to expand into multiple facets of American life and in a short time became inter nationalized. What happens when a law reform move ment seemingly unfractured by power differences goes international [Nader r995)? Many textbook descriptions of dispute resolution use tising. Mandatory mediation is confidential and private, not public. Cases are not usually recorded, and, as far as I know, there is little regulation and next to no accountability-something like the situ ation in psychotherapy, for example. When Grillo's article ap peared, pressures to have her removed from her position and public vilification by professional mediators encouraged me to interview her about the stakeholders she had offended. I I. It is difficult to talk about conflict or its opposite without strong moral overtones. We need to distinguish between the ideol ogy of one or the other and the behaviors and social consequences associated with them. Thus with mediation the rhetoric is harmo nious; the process may be contentious, the social consequences pacifying and restrictive. The current controversy is not so much over harmony and conflict as over a shift in the proper domains of the two and the privatization of emotions and injustice. The larger question, as one of my fonner students put it, is why in Euro American cultures it has consistently been believed that commu nitlls, political peace, and harmony are the "natural" order.
a standard sequential order of legal evolution that es pouses a telos: hierarchically lower societies supposedly evolve from self·help and negotiation to mediation, arbitration, and finally adjudication IHoebel '954, Schwartz and Miller 19641 . Many writings on legal evo lution have considered the simple presence of courts a sign of societal complexity, evolution, and develop ment; during the colonial era the development of courts was considered part of the "civilizing mission." The In ternational Court of Justice was promoted as the apex of forums for settlement of international disputes by means of adjudication and arbitration. All these posi tions were ideologically consistent with the works of evolutionary social theorists. Yet by the 1980s and 1990S, just as alternative dispute resolution in the United States was shifting the rhetoric from justice to hannony, so at the international level the notion of "mature" negotiation began to replace the World Court as the standatd of civilized behaviot. Why this valoriz ing of negotiation? An international legal scholar IGong 1984:551 put his finger on the key-elasticity: "The less 'civilized' were doomed to work toward an equality which an elastic standard of civilization pUt forever be yond their reach." Edward Said 119781 had noticed this earlier when he observed that the valorizing of one cul tural form over another is frequently linked to imbal ances of power. Now that the "primitives ll have courts, we move to alternative dispute resolution, a culturally encapsulated form of international negotiation that has emerged in the United States from the disciplines of law, economics, social psychology, political science, and psychotherapy.
What was different about the new international nego tiators was nOt their practice of mediation or negotia tion but their distaste for confrontation, the adversary process, justice acquired by win-lose methods, and equality before the law. They were also linked by an in difference to the international court, which since the emergence of new nations (many of them ffThird World"l was being used to represent new interests. For example, in 1984 Nicaragua filed suit against the United States, which withdrew from the case and shortly thereafter lalong with the U.S.S.R.) withdrew from the agreement to comply with the decisions of the court. Controlling processes are double-edged.
Water resource disputes illustrate the shift of dispute resolution away from adjudication and arbitration to ward negotiation. In instances of international river dis putes such as those over the Danube, the Colorado, the Jordan, the Duoro, and the Ganges, mention of the In ternational Court of Justice is replaced by phrases such as IImutuallearning,1I "information sharing.." "hanno nizing,lI and "cooperation." Zero-sum settlements be come "hostile," and information, analysis, and solution are viewed as getting in the way of "constructive dia logue." Under such conditions, mind-games become a central component of the negotiation process.
11 Toxic 11. See Linnertooth's 1990 article on negotiating settlements in the Danube River 8asm, m whieh she speaks about win·win bargaining to be accomplished by those who share "a certain professional ra-
poisoning is referred to as a "perception of toxic poison· ing," and the question becomes how cultural behavior can be used or neutralized. The international "priva tization" of justice through alternative dispute resolu tion centers in the United States is striking, as is the contempt for the judicial process. Many writers on international negotiation imply the existence of a /luniversal diplomatic culture ll of negoti ators. Sometimes justification for such a view is attrib uted to anthropological research on negotiation, nota bly the work of Philip Gulliver (1979) . However, what is claimed to be universal here is instead hegemonic, de veloped in the United States in the r970S and exported worldwide by an expanding alternative dispute resolu tion industry; it is a coercive harmony whose primary function is producing order of a repressive sort. In the international river disputes it is the stronger parties that prefer negotiation.
Harmony legal models or adversarial models may originate locally and spread or be imposed for purposes of control or resistance to control, resulting in the redis tribution of power. Anthropologists know, of course, that dispute resolution ideologies have long been used as a mechanism for the transmission of hegemonic ideas, and indeed we no longer speak of culture as refer ring simply to shared traditions passed from one genera· tion to another. The study of structures and activities that cross boundaries, including the boundaries of what has long been shared culture, illuminates places where power may be reconfigured and societies transformed. The question of choice is just such a place.
STANDARDIZING THE BODY; THE QUESTION OF CHOICE
The question of choice is centIal to the story of how medicine and business generate controlling processes in the shaping of women's bodies. Foucault It967) demon strates how changes in the concept of madness led to changes in diagnosis and treatment of the insane and of social attitudes toward them. He describes how chang ing perceptions of madness in parts of Western Europe from the Middle Ages to the end of the 19th century led to the separation of /lmad" persons from the rest of society, their classification as deviants, and finally their subjection to social control. He focuses on the cultural controls that led to the social controls; ideas about mad ness led to asylums for the mad. A similar incremental process is central to discussions of the commodification of a woman's body Isee, e.g., Lock 19931. Images of the body appear natural within theit spe cific cultural milieus. For example, feminist researchers have analyzed the practice of breast implantation in the United States from the vantage point of the cultural mi lieu, and in the Sudan ILightfoot-Klein 1989), female circumcision and infibulation serve to accentuate a feminine appearance. Thus, Sudanese and other African tionality." The Negotiation louma} is replete with examples of this new psychological negotiation culture.
women, American women/ and others experience body mutilation as part of engendering rites. However/ many writers differentiate infibulation from breast implanta tion by arguing that American women choose to have breast implants whereas in Africa women are presum ably subject to indoctrination {and besides, young girls are too young to choosej. One of the most heated de bates arising from the public health concern over breast implants is whether the recipients are freely situated that is, whether their decision is voluntary or whether control is disguised as free will.
An informed response to the free-choice argument re quires knowing how the beauty-industrial complex works. It requires sensitive fieldwork in multiple sites and an understanding of emergent idea systems in in cremental change. Linda Coco [t9941 builds upon the insights tevealed by Howard Zinn's (19841 The Twenti eth Century: A People's History. Zinn cites a 1930S magazine article which begins with the statement, "The average American woman has sixteen square feet of skin" IZinn 1984:2041. This is followed by an item ized list of the annual beauty needs of every woman. Sixty years later the beauty-industrial complex is a multibillion-dollat industry that segments the female body and manufactures commodities of and fot the body.
As Coco shows/ some women get caught in the offi~ cial beauty ideology, and in the case of silicone-gel breast implants some hundreds of thousands of women have been ensnared. But who gets caught and when is important to an understanding of the ecology of power. The average age of a woman having breast implantation is 36 years, and she has an average of two children. She is the beauty industry's insecure consumer recast as a patient IClaeson 1994). She is somehow deviant; het so cial illness is deformity at hypemophy Ismail breastsl. Coco (t994:1 I r) quotes a past president of the American Society of Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery [ASPRSI: "There is substantial and enlarging medical knowledge to the effect that these deformities [small bteasts] are really a disease which result in the patient's feelings of inadequacies, lack of self-confidence, distortion of body image, and a total lack of well-being due to a lack of self-perceived femininity.... Enlatgement ... is thete fore. _ . necessary to ensure the quality of life for the Ifemalel patient." In other words, cosmetic surgery is necessary to the patient's psychological health.
The plastic surgeon regards the construction of the of ficial bteast as att, the aim being to teform the female body accotding to the ideals of classic Western att. One surgeon pioneering procedures for correcting deformity took as his ideal female figure that of ancient Greek statues/ which he carefully measured, noticing the ex act size and shape of the breasts, their vertical location between the third and seventh tibs, the horizontal be tween the line of the sternal border and the anterior ax illary line, and so forth_ In Coco's analysis the exercise of the plastic surgeon's techno-art re-creates a particular static, official breast shape and applies this creation as tensibly to relieve women's mental suffering. The sur geon becomes a psychological healer as well as an artist.
Along with art and psychology, there is, of course, the business of organized plastic surgery, which responds to the demands and opportunities of market economics. By the late 1970S and early 1980s there was a glut of plastic surgeons. The ASPRS began to operate like a commercial enterprise instead of a medical society, sat urating the media with ads and even providing low-cost financing. The discourse became a sales pitch. Women "seek" breast implants to keep theit husbands or their jobs, to attract men, or to become socially acceptable. Coco calls this "patriarchal capitalism" and questions whether this is free choice or "mind colonization./I Understanding {Ichoice'/ led Coco to an examination of the power both in the doCtor-patient telationship and in the control of information. By various means certain women-the insecure consumers-are led to trust and believe in modem medical technology. What is most important in being "caught" is their internalization of the social message. Coco's conclusion that American women are subtly indoctrinated to recognize and desire a certain kind of beauty presents an interesting possibil ity. Women /I were told by the media/ plastic surgeons, women's magazines/ other women l and the business wotld that they could enhance theit lives by enhancing their bust lines. .. the social imperative for appearance was petsonalized, psychologized, and normalized" ICoco 1994:1201. Social surveys indicate that, to the ex tent that women internalize the social imperative, they feel they are making the decision on their own.
Not surprisingly, women whose surgery resulted in medical complications often came to recognize the ex ternal processes of coercive persuasion that had led them to seek implants. In some ways, they resembled formet cult membets who had been deprogtammed: their disillusionment caused them to question the sys tem that had encouraged them to make the decision in the fitst place (Singer with Lalich 19951 . The result was a gtadual building of ptotest against the industry, ex pressed in networks/ newsletters/ support groups, work shops, and seminars. As have some former cult mem bers, women have brought suit, testified before lawmakers, and challenged in othet ways some of the largest corporations and insurance companies in the land" The choice of implants, they learn, is part of a matrix of controlling processes in which women are 13. In a book just published (1996) , Science on Trial: The Clash of Medical Evidence and the Law in the Breast Implant Case, Marcia Angell looks at the battle over breast implants and concludes that society is to blame for not accepting scientific medicine's collec tive judgments and mode of reasoning. Dr. Angell has been an ex pert witness for breast implant manufacturers and casts her argu ment in the anti-antiscience mode. In a term paper titled "Silicone: An Inert Substance!" Sara Fisch asks why the focus on silicone has remained on breast implants when implants account for approxi mately I % of company revenues. The bulk of silicone sales are in the aerospace, auto, cosmetic, and food industries. According to Fisch it is in the corporate interest that silicone be a woman's issue to divert public scrutiny from silicone itself. subjects. Given the right circumstances it could happen to anyone. [n the Sudan (Lightfoot-Klein 1989) , the young girl is told that circumcision and infibulation are done for her and not to her. In the United States the mu tilation of natural breasts is also done for the re-creation of femininity. Although power is exercised differently in these two cases, Coco notes the similarity: "The op eration on the female breast in America holds much of the same social symbolism and expression of cultural mandate as does infibulation in Sudan. Thus, the ques tion of why women choose breast augmentation be comes moot " (1994:125) .
Breast implantation is now spreading elsewhere, most notably to China. Will it become a functional equivalent to foot-binding in China as pan of the com petition between patriarchies East and West? Whatever the answer, many social thinkers agree that people are always more vulnerable to intense persuasion during periods of historical dislocation-a break with Struc tures and symbols familiar to the life cycle-in which the media can bring us images and ideas originating in past, contemporary, or even imaginary worlds.
Feminist researchers have sought to crack controlling paradigms such as those that define women's capacities and those that construct a standardized body shape and determine what is beautiful in women. The movementS against standardizing beauty were preceded by movements in the United States against standardized scholastic testing that developed here, the home of the largest and mOSt pow erful testing companies. The test·bias analyses and truth-in-testing legislation spread from ew York across the country in an attempt to break the tests by trainmg students to improve testing scores; the tests have been advertised as testing innate abilities (see Nairn 1980). NADER Controlling Processes 17r7 movement in which a critical anthropology, along with other reflexive disciplines, plays a central role.
Nelson Grabum (1991) has identified three historic periods in the history of museum exhibits, each re flecting a particular ideology: display of power and sta tus, education of the masses, and empowerment through interpretation. The debate on the function of museums from the native's point of view, focusing on the dynamic relation between the museum and Native Americans, was among the urgent political and episte mological issues of representation and repatriation that reinvigorated anthropological work on museums in the 1970S. Michael Ames ([9861 applied Ivan lllich's 119711 idea of de-schooling to museums of the neocolonial type as part of a reflexive, self-critical anthropology of museums. During the late 1970S and 1980s museum studies began to be cross-disciplinary, and there was a heightened awareness of what museums actually do in relation ro some of the ideological zeitgeists that Gra burn enumerated. Interdisciplinary concerns pointed to the manner in which museums control and subordinate the past (MacCannell 1976) in an effort to portray the "modernization" of America. Museums were recog nized as status symbols (Kelly 19871 , and criticism of them included an examination of the gendered, ra cialized construction of natural history exhibits (Hara way 1984) as well as the connections between museums and imperialism attached to notions of "the white man's burden" (Haacke 19861 .
All of the above-mentioned research points to the rec ognition that museums do not exist in a vacuum. It indicates a critical rethinking of the functions of mu seums and their relations to movements such as colo nialism or nationalism and ideologies such as marxism and capitalism. There is a surprising shortage of ethno graphic works analyzing specific controversial exhibits. Two exceptions that come to mind are the Glenbow Museum controversy in Canada (Halpin 19781 and George Marcus's 1990 "The Production of European High Culture in Los Angeles." The critical ethno graphic examination of the Smithsonian's "Science in American Life" exhibit by a young anthropologist inter ested in the contemporary science/anti-antiscience de bates (Vackimes 19961 is evidence of what happens when stakeholding becomes incendiary.
Writers locked in these debates often depict so-called antiscience people as "savages," ignorant lay people, or scholars outside the boundaries of a nanowly defined "science." This makes the study of "us" (interested lay people) and "them" (the scientists) imperative, as lay persons become the "natives" struggling for power-a situation, by the way, not so different from the case of the Canadian Cree mentioned in connection with the Glenbow Museum and its sponsors. The Smithsonian conuoversy contains all the significant political and theoretical issues with which contemporary anthropol ogy has been concerned: displays of power, representa tion, history and the cultural wars over history, sym bolic po""er and the power of material objects, education, public participation, culture and multicul turalism, magic, science, and religion, and hegemony. Anthropologists would not have attempted such an analysis a century ago because as a discipline we had not yet achieved the detachment, the experience, and the critical maturity necessary to do so. We first needed to experience colonialism and nationalism, and we needed to focus on the idea of the "Other" in order to recognize colonized roles in our own society and ideo logical components in the basic operating concepts of our discipline.
The If Science in American Life" exhibit was, as its curaror. Arthur Molella (19941, pointed om, about an extraordinarily complex and evolving interrelationship between science and society. A historian of science and a member of the exhibit advisory committee noted that the exhibit "neither attacks nor celebrates science and scientists, but provides museum visitors with an excit ing and infonnative account of science as a human and social enterprise reflecting the society in which it is nurtured and having important social, economic, and political consequences. Isn't that what 'scientific liter acy' should be abom'" (Weiner 19941 . The task of the anthropologist was to examine and analyze the cultural battles over what the exhibit was really concerned with.
Science exhibits often aim at producing awe at the wonder or strangeness of nature, displaying man's con quest over natural forces, or celebrating great scientists and their discoveries and inventions. As Vackimes points out, "Science in American Life" did none of these things. Instead of illustrating /lscientific prog ress," the 22 case studies in the exhibit focused on the impact of science and urged the public to think about the meaning of the development of the contraceptive pill, the atomic bomb, food additives, scientific educa tion, and the advent of coal tar products and the cre ation of synthetic fabrics, paints, aspirin, and pesticides. Obscure inventors, vaccines and DNA, medical innova tions, dyes for blue jeans, radio circuits, and hard wa ter-these were the curiosities in this museum exhibit. Perhaps the material object that most clearly symbol ized the different interests of the lay public and some scientists was the relic of a family fallout shelter of the post-World War IT years. At firsr rhe shelter had seemed to be a sensible technological solution as effective pro tection from the destructive potential of the atomic bomb, but after the development of the hydrogen bomb it had come to look ineffective. The worry among some scientists on the museum's advisory board was that the shelter would be perceived as a symbol of scientific evil IMoiella and Stephens 1995:91.
The exhibit stimulated as outraged a reaction among some members of the scientific community as any rep resentation jor misrepresentation) of the cultures of na tive peoples. There were implicit and explicit threats to jobs, calls for revisions and reparations, accusations of the demonizing of science. IS The outraged scientists I). In:1 personal communication the secretary of the Smithsonian, I. Michael Heyman, noted that his critiCism of Molella's exhibit has to do with H more sensitively balancing positive and negative wanted a script that portrayed the glories of American science and technology, one that celeblated Nobel Lau reates. A contextualized scientific representation was considered a belligerent act worthy of characterization as antiscientiBc. The exhibit, in the spirit of the new museology, elicited a public analysis of the meaning of science and progress in American life, which in tum drew criticism to the Smithsonian for its alleged attack on the sacred scientific establishment. The secretary of the Smithsonian argued for evenhanded exhibits. The "Science in American Life" exhibit is currently being dismantled and reformed for the major benefactor, the American Chemical Society. The "higher superstition" that Gross and Levitt (19941 attlibute to antiscientific thinking may belong to us all. 16 Anthropologists understand the social organization of groups and know that practitioners of Big Science are separated spatially from lay people. They also under stand that scientists themselves are differentiated. Our science museums have been the special repositories for the mystery, majesty, and fascination of science, as Vackimes points out. But the Smithsonian exhibit was housed in the National Museum of American History, where the curators apparently penetrated the previously impenetrable disguise of modem science. As a result of the juxtaposition of meanings, the ethnographer and the curators were able to comprehend the political and sa cred workings of //the scientific mind."
The Power of Concepts FROM SOCIAL CONTROL TO CULTURAL CONTROL To place controlling processes research in the context of American anthropology, it is important to note the changing place of "social cantroll/ relative to //cultural control" in the U.S. social science literature. During the past cen tury notions of control that were themselves hegemonic have given way to an ever more critical ap proach to the use of disciplinary concepts. Early on, so effects [of science]." He thinks of MoleU3's exhibit as eV3luating
American science when what the curator was attempting was an exhibit on science in American life. In a speech before the Ameri can Association of Museums IMinneapolis, May 4, 1996), Heyman made the case for more balanced exhibits by contrasting the role of the curator with that of the academic. He argued that in univer sities no one is responsible for the opinions expressed by its faculty; their work is attributed. Curators, in contrast, present their view· points anonymously, and he quoted a colleague as opining that such anonymity is potentially "authoritarian." Heyman con· eluded, "Presenting at least two sides of an important issue and letting the visitors know exactly what is evidence and what is in terpretation can only enhance broader public understanding." He did not mention satisfying the American Chemical Society, nor did he understand that interpretation is not the same as evaluation. 16. The recent publication Naked Science lNader 1996b) responds to Gross and Levitt's provincialisms and contains essays on science practices (rather than idealization) in physics, immunology, mathe matics, biotechnology, and other fields. See also the burgeoning lit erature on the anthropology of science to which leading anthropol ogists such as Sharon Traweek, Hugh Custerson, Emily Martin, and Paul Rabinow have contributed.
cial control theorists examined power within the con text of an ideological worldview in which harmony and order were assumed to be positively valued. Although the notion of culture in its romantic version also as sumed a consensual basis that was hegemonic, anthro pologists have increasingly backed away from this no tion as well as from related ideas such as social control.
Edward Alsworth Ross Ir90rl first advanced the con cept of social control in the wake of labor unrest in the post-Civil War period. With the abolition of slavery came a reorganization of slavery-based relationships. During that period of rapid industrialization, industrial jobs were replacing those in farming and wage work was replacing self-employment. It was a period of high im migration and of populist political movement, a time when the crisis of control was a central theme of indus trial thought. Ross's work on the human practices and arrangements that contribute to social order and influ ence people to conform centered on the hegemonic the sis that social order exists because of society's con scious control of the individual. It took little account of the destitute and the thoughtful, for whom consensual social control was more likely an illusion that served special interests. Theorizers of controlling processes are now at pains to differentiate between control that is consensual and the notion that consensus is control.
In the early 20th century, especially during the period following World War I, labor struggles erupted from Se atrle to Boston. The response was brutal: there were fir ings, repression, retaliatory raids, and massive deporta tion of immigrant workers and radicals. Such actions were the results of a broad attempt to create a stable workforce. As historians of the period observe, indus try's need for a certain kind of order came to be equated with the needs of the society. Yet the contradictions be tween repressive police tactics and a democratic gov ernment also needed to be addressed. It was in this con text that American industry began to produce an apparatus that, though aimed at quieting worker unrest, allows us a glimpse of the social textures of industrial ization INoble 19771. The move was in Ihe direction of "human management," and it represented a change in business's method of social control. "Handling the help" was central to business survival, and the pursuit of peaceful social relations was becoming an important pall of modem management. Psychology became the darling of industry in the shift from overt coercion to implicit persuasion.
The development of human management techniques moved away from a conception of workers in their pro ductive capacity toward the organization of labor out side the factory. Business worked to invent a culture that fitted the needs of a new industrial society; the in dustrial process stretched that culture into the commu nities and structures in which workers lived, thereby creating a conception of worker that was as different from the traditional one as Brave New World is from 1984. The new managers were creating a modern archi tecture of daily life in which advertising was dubbed "a civilizing influence." The goal was the prevention of re-sistance to industrial culture INash r989, Wallace 19781 .
The distinction between social and cultural control allows for the distinction between control over groups or relationships and control of the mind, both pall of any controlling process. Increasingly control moved from a social to a cultural mode; social control or overt coercion is culturally less acceptable in a democratic so ciety, and in the late 20th century cultural control is more effective-a notion that European social thinkers were quicker to grasp than their U.S. counterparts (Aug'; r982). Some have argued that the evolution from overt control to subtle cultural control is progress, indi cating that the world is incleasingly less governed by violence; yet we have in internalized violence the cog nitive dissonance that has often led to a good deal of violence. 17 Advertising, worker safety and recreation programs, welfare programs, and language and civics classes were control mechanisms that created new traditions for the consumer class of a new industrial order while at the same time training consumers in seductive, subliminal appeals-mobilizing the instinct, civiliZing the self, and commercializing expression (Ewen r9761 ." Scholars were constructing and debating cultural control and conceptions of culture, and anthropologists were in the middle of such debates. Ruth Benedict (19341 was writ ing about coherence in culture, Edwald Sapir (1924) about "culture, genuine and spurious/' and Franz Boas about the shackles of tradition in the Euro-American transition to modernity. Although anthropologists have written about language, ritual, symbols, and ideology in the light of cultural control, the term "cultural control" itself owes more to the literature on ideology dealing With, for example, science, sexuality, religion, business, politics, and professional domains. Control by means of culture is often implicit and not dramatic and is related to the creation of social categories and expectations and to ideological construction. Sutton et al. 119561 wrote about this, and so did Geertz 11973:193-233) .
Ideologies may be said to exist in all societies, al though some argue that they appeared only with the French Revolution IAug,; 1982:5). The same French scholars consider civilizational societies of the Western SOrt to be at the high end of Ihe ideological spectrum and classless societies at "the innocent end" Ip. 6). In this usage ideology is characteristic of class difference. 17. Ellen Hertz (personal communication) suggests that "truth" no longer has the inflammatory/empowering effects that it used to (contrast Watergate with Irangatel. Something has happened that further disconnects the academy {where much research on power takes place) from society (where many are increasingly apathetic). A good example is in the area of feminism: power is central to femi niSt research, but outside the academy feminism is vinually dead. Comaroff and Comaroff (1991:231, hegemony should be distinguished from culture and ideology, in contrast to Gramsci's view of it as "ideology in its highest sense." But systems of ideas, beliefs, and values expressed in lit erature, professional training, advertising, ritual, and various media and found in various classes are also he gemonic/ though naturalized and assumed. Systems of this sort, which spring from central sources, are ex tremely powerful tools of influence. The study of he gemony portrays the exercise of ideology through class penetration rather than through class domination. If culture refers to shared symbolic meaning from which hegemonic forms are cast, ideologies may be seen as more localized and tightly integrated worldviews, and the two concepts are interdependent. Raymond Wil liams's (r9771 definition of hegemony (in contrast to Gramsci's view of it as a totalized state) is something like "controlling processes'/ (Kurtz 1996) .20 Hegemonic control in the form of mind colonization takes on great importance in the 1990S in relation to an understanding of whar Christopher Lasch calls "the social transforma tion implicit in technological change, the transforma tion of American culture by advertising, the mutual de pendence of indusrry and education" (quored in Noble I97?:xiii)-in sum, the controlling ideologies of an in dustrialized state which in only a few decades became hegemonic.
Anthropological research on domination and resis tance has shown the power of cultural controL Cultural control when it is hegemonic is impersonal, embedded, and often invisible, and even those who in fact exercise it may not understand its extent, thinking of it as only marketing. Yeti certainly since Aldous Huxley/s Brave New World (r9321, those who study video games, sexual preoccupations, standardized testing, television pro gramming, and advertising have been aware of the pres ence of such forces, which channel our time, our behav ior, our values, and our notions of what it is to be old, beautiful, sexy, or clever. These forces are often non· ideological or ami-ideological, alrhough they are de fended in terms of ideological constructs such as free market competition, free and open science, meritoc racy, or self-realization.
Most critical scholars raday back away from ideologi cal definitions of their basic operating concepts. Legal scholars noted early that changing the questions asked 20. Gramsci referred to hegemony in two instances: hegemony as organized by intellectuals, the "dominant group's 'deputies'li (Gramsci 1971:12) , and the "conquest of hegemony by a subaltern class" (Sassoon 1987 :1291, what some call "coumerhegemony." Moreover, although hegemony may imply the control of the masses by dominant classes, the nature of the acquiescence is open to interpretive fleXibility-that is, the efficacy of hegemonic struc tures of thought-as in the basic structural formulation of hegem ony as the domination of one group over others. The former is a point that the political scientist James Scott elaborates in Domina tion and the Arts of Resistance (1990) , showing the importance of distinguishing the exact degree of hegemonic domination in order to provide for the dynamics of resistance and consent. Hegemonic ideas can therefore be considered to be in flux, constructed and re constructed by various aCtors and institutions of diverse social, cul tural, and political contexts. Provided that this dynamic aspect is acknowledged, hegemony can be a useful conceptual tool in de scribing the sociocultural aspects of controlling processes. in criminology altered paradigmatic categories from so cial control to cultural control (Chambliss r9821 . The traditional question of criminologists-why it is that some people commit crimes while others do not-was no longer pertinent in the face of civil rights demonstra tions/ antiwar protests, the middle-class use of mari juana and cocaine, and blatant criminality and tax or regulatory evasion by giant corporations and political leaders. The question instead became why law defines some acts as criminal and not others. And attention then focused on how law as ideology works as a vehicle for consolidating or maintaining power relations and, by means of hegemony} achieving widespread consent.
Anthropologists often discuss control in terms of con formity. Bronislaw Malinowski (r932 [r92611 in his work on the Trobriand Islanders developed the notion of reciprocity as the guiding principle in maintaining conforming behavior. Edmund Leach (19771 discussed conformity in relation to domination; earlier, Dorothy Lee 119591 contrasted cultures that celebrate freedom wirhout using the word wirh U.S. culture, which has the word but is characterized by much conformist be havior. Elizabeth Colson (r9741, questioning the transi tion between internal and external controls} argued that centralized authorities are both limiting and liberating. I am more particularly concerned with the control that emanates from diffused power entering the minds of participants across temporal and spatial boundaries. This is not a new phenomenon; religious conversions, the divine right of kings in Europe, the mandate of heaven in China are all part of world history. What is new is multiplicity and delivery systems, for example, to young children by marketing, virtual reality, and television, and the time lag of awareness that may re sult. Controlling processes travel as people and institu tions travel, and each person} each group, each object} each institution contributes to diffusion and transcul turation (Wolf r9821. In modem ideologies, science, technology, and the idea of progress are prominent symbols in relation to controL Anthropologists sometimes use labels such as "traditional" and }/modern" to challenge the notion of progress as the rationale for European global expansion. Yet the idea of progress is still used as justification, for example} for conquest, education} genocide, slave labor, proselytizing} exploitation of natural resources, and gambling on American Indian reservations and in pro mulgating legal policies, beauty standards, and hierar· chy in science. The European notion of progress was im planted in the Third World (and in the Fourth World, often by Third Worldersl as a goal amounting to mod ernization. As Norbert Elias (I978) reminds us, lithe civ ilizing process" does not discriminate.
In the United States democratic process is necessarily in conflict with the way in which economic and sym bolic power works. When the use of social control be comes less culturally acceptable, especially for the mid dle class, the use of cultural control becomes more central to the whole mechanics of power, and with it the cognitive dissonance associated with living in a world that does not work in the idealized way.
CULTURE DEBATES
Understanding debates about culture includes viewing culture as a historically based idea, some say a romantic Germanic idea-essentially hegemonic social criti cism directed against the disintegrating effects of indus trialization IBorofsky 1994:243-3091. Idealized 19th century culture assumes a consensual basis at a period when cultural nationalisms were rooted in ethnic and folk traditions during the rise of nation-states in Eu rope. Along with industrialization these traditions helped shape the culture concepts used today (Keesing 1976:307) . However, contemporary uses of culture by powerful political entities IFarmer n.d.) are not easily explained as romanticism or social criticism. Power holders may manipulate culture to control others much as cult leaders do their followers. A prime example of the use of cultural arguments by the fundamentalists of the political right works to articulate a politics of exclu sion IStolcke 19951 based on an alleged propensity in human nature to reject strangers.
Anthropological concepts are l of course, influenced by their times. In the period before the awakening of an thropologists to analyses of cultural hegemonies l an thropologists were commonly preoccupied with purity. As Mintz 11970:14) reminded us, "old Coca-Cola signs, a cuisine littered with canned corned beef and imported Spanish olives all observed within the reach of radio and television these are not the things anthropologi cal dreams are made oL" As a fonn of advocacy, anthro pologists were also preoccupied with studying culture and society as lIstan dardized behaviour, II not random and unorganized "savagery" (Siegfried Nadel, quoted in Moore 1994: 363) . Dell Hymes (r972) reminded us that there was strong resistance to publishing studies of ac culturation in the official journal in the 1930S on the ground that they were "not anthropologyll; some an thropologists even stopped studying Indians in the [930S because they had become "jUSt like any other mi nority group" and, therefore, presumably had lost their culture. Similar observations about what anthropolo giStS did and did not study in Africa were made by Sieg fried Nadellr947) in his work on the Nuba and by Isaac Schapera 119381 in his work among the Tswana. Culture in their time was "common identity," which unfortu nately often excluded the culture and influence of colo nizers. Even by 1974, the call to IIstudy up" was thought to be "a kind of muckraking anthropology" (Kaplan 19741 . The study of the cultures of power, as in Richard N. Adams's study of Guatemala 11970), was nOt main stream.
Not surprisingly, as the search for an anthropology concerned with the widest issues of modem life acceler ated, the magnifying glass landed on the culture con cept. In Reinventing Anthropology 119721 Hymes re minded us that by separating the notion of culture from In the United States, culture may appear natural and inevitable because it is deliberately made to appear so by the manipulation of cultural images that articulate what people should be, should think, should buy Inot that they always dol. A strong belief in free will often impedes understanding of how lives are changed by cul tural practices that are external to the individual and intended to modify individual behavior, for example l through political propaganda or economic marketing. Anthropologists witness and experience the construc tion of culture for financial gain. We are a marketing society. Yet for the most part our professional stance has been somewhat analogous to that of the anthropolo gists of the colonial period, who were criticized for writ· ing about "pure native ll culture before it disappeared while all around them native cultures were changing. When we close our eyes and minds to the possibilities of ethnographic research in taking a vertical slice of contemporary colonizers and colonized, we still prac tice anthropology in much the same way. In spite of re cent gains" we still ignore the ramifications of the com mercial world and the multinationals-as if they were not changing every one of us, whether consciously re sistant or not. More and more, modem technologies, population movements, and changing social organiza tions make us captives of our cultures (Henry r9631.
On Home Ground "Crappy corporate culture," the cabby said as we passed Union Square's Nike and Disneyland sites. "Where'd you get your education?/1 I returned. {'Same place you did, lady. Look around-it's everywhere./1 "Hmm," I thought, liThe French call it American culture." When we work in our own society as "native anthropologists, /I the implicit view of cultures as systems of shared val ues or meanings limits our ability to see the historical shape of the cultural or to recognize the deliberate in vention of tradition IHobsbawm and Ranger r9831. Al though we consciously construct concepts to challenge ideological hegemony, the continuing shortage of eth nographic analyses of cultural hegemonies at home sig nals the persistence of this naive view.: Z2 The dilemmas of the anthropologist working at home are recognized by the biographer of the 19th-century Smithsonian ethnographer James Mooney IMoses 19841.23 In attempting to explain to white American in tellectuals, missionaries, and government agents and the reading public why Native Americans practiced the Ghost Dance and why there was a Sioux outbreak of vi olence in l890 IMooney l8961, Mooney violated two unwritten rules that still restrict possibilities for native anthropologists in the United States. First, he offered an explanation that went to root causes, attributing the American Indian "problem" to the destabilizing effect of white society. Sioux "culture," he made a connectionY Second, he compared Native American and European religious re vitalization as if they were equivalent, thereby ques tioning the positional superiority of white culture. His work offended the sensibilities of the powerful, includ ing anthropologists, and eventually he was denied ac cess by government officials to Indian reservations.
The srory of James Mooney foreshadowed activity during two world wars and the cold war, when hysterias about red, pink, and socialist politics became common place and encouraged self-censorship. The general avoidance of issues of power generated a failure of eth nography." This failure in itself gives special value to contemporary works that make connections between experience and macroprocesses. The point here is that while culture theory critics usually deal with our de scription of the so-called Other, similar arguments apply to native anthropologists working on home ground.
Henry (l963), Lee Il9591, and Hymes Il9721 must have discovered when they read reviews of their works that there was widespread discomfort among anthropol ogists about describing our culture lias it is," especially when tacit assumptions regarding state or corporate power were examined. This discomfort can be ad dressed only through awareness of controlling processes inside and outside of academia (Furner r975, Nadel I997) aimed at producing confonnity and selective blindness. Selective blindness-depending on our con ceptual categories rather than on ethnographic reali ties-kept us, for example, from predicting the revolu tion in highland Peru IStarn 1994).
A Concluding Comment Malinowski 1932 Il9261 recognized that controls oper ate most effectively through symbols that society places beyond the jurisdiction of its fonmal and social control system. Mintz illustrated how ideas linked to the disparities of power grow and are nurtured through interlocking institutions. Cultural control is often the result of incremental, not abrupt, change, and when it is achieved incrementally it is powerful indeed because it slides in rather unnoticed and comes to be considered natural. The controlling processes I have described here have gradually come to seem natural: in the first exam 24. The historian Hugh Macmillan (1995) reminds us that over 50 years ago Max Gluckman made the same kind of connection in his definition of the social field in the southern pan of Africa. He sought to explain the paradox of "cleavage, opposition and relative stability" by drawing upon a number of sources: lithe Marxist the ory of contradiction, the Freudian notion of ambivalence, Gregory Bateson's idea of 'schismogenesis,' the work of Edward Evans Pmchard on 'situational selection,' and of Meyer Fortes on 'fission and fusion.''' 25. Hugh Gusterson 119931 eloquently addresses this question in his discussion of ethnographic writing on militarism or any con tested terrain that strains the conventional pursuit of objectivity while also exempting elites from scrutiny and facilitating control of oppositional groups.
pIe, /lharmony" became desirable as the natural order of things; the existence of "choice" was assumed in the second and strengthened by the belief in individualism; and in the last "science" was envisioned as separated from society.
Two of the many events described in the examples were counterhegemonic. The Zapotec adopted coercive harmony in their construction of barriers against colo· nial domination and for autonomy. Museum curators adopted a new museology as a tool of empowerment. Individuals may move in and out of various controlling processes, be caught by them, and remake them as did the women who had breast implants. The same controls may be effective across class lines, as in the eventS lead ing to the spread of harmony ideologies from the ghettos to the workplace to environmental activism. Implicit persuasion is easier to manage than overt coer cion.
A catholic view of culture, one that recognizes that the world is always only partly integrated or coherent or in effect only partly shared, changes the questions we ask and the perceptions we mold. If there is general value to be derived from this line of research} it is not only in the documentation of how controlling processes work to change behavior without force and violence or the unmasking of power but also in the recognition of how quickly they can do so. Considering counterhege monies implies possibilities for general cultural depro grammings, including a questioning of basic assump tions that may be impediments to anthropologists working on home ground. The relationship between colonizers and colonized studied by anthropologists in some ways parallels the interaction between industrial· ists and their target populations IMintz r996). Power is implicated in both settings, and so is resistance. The colonizing of minds and bodies does not differentiate between subjects, and yet-why is still unexplained we know even less of industrial subjects than we do of colonized ones. Nader's analysis of controlling processes is the product of profound reflection over four decades in various so cial and cultural contexts. Therefore the theoretical methodological proposal that she offers here manages to articulate theoretical concepts with suggestive insights on the processes of control operating in various aspects of everyday life. In a concise exposition she weaves to gether ideology, hegemony} social control, and cultural control in order to reveal the visible and hidden facets of power encrusted and reproduced in social institu-N A D E R Controlling Processes 1723 tions and in "common senseI! constructed as a cultural system IGeertz r 9941.
Comments

ALICIA BARABAS
Instituto Nacional de Antropologia
Nader shows the dynamic nature of central ideas such as harmony, civilization, choice, beauty, and sci ence from the analytical focus of control as a strategy for constructing power. She uses rhree ethnographic ex amples drawn from the North American sociocultural universe to demonstrate how and why power is con· structed and used, how central dogmas are configured, and how individuals and groups are influenced and sub tly persuaded to accept them as natural and value them positively.
The distinction between social and cultural control proves central to the analysis of controlling processes, the former establishing control over groups or relations and the latter seeking control over ideas. Nader locates the beginnings of this process of differentiation in the emergence of industrial capitalism, whose need for peaceful labor and social relations led to the elevation of order and harmony to the status of positive universal values and replaced open coercion with control by per suasion. Control has increasingly shifted from social or coercive to cultural or persuasive, since the latter has proved culturally more acceptable in the modern world and also more effective. Violence is considered "uncivi lized" except when it is exercised in the name of civili zation.
What Nader does not expressly say is that the idea of harmony that in the United States has been understood as virtue and civilization-as opposed to conflict or vio lence, understood as vice and barbarism-or as the nat ural order of things and a sign of progress is part of an ideological paradigm of cultural superiority. Just like the universalized stereotype of beauty, which leads to a broad spectrum of values and attitudes ranging from IIvoluntary" mutilation to racism, the "convictions" of a hegemonic paradigm, once reiRed} internalized, posi· tively valued, and socially reproduced, allow the classi fication of the social behaviors and phenOtypes of other cultures or subcultures according to criteria ethnocen trically defined from a supposed maximum level of "civilization."
Since there are many ways of conceptualizing reality, Nader argues, what is accepted as truth depends on the intimate association between power and knowledge. Therefore, it might be added, the hegemonic paradigm is capable nOt only of cataloging but, through the pro cesses of cultural control, of expanding beyond national boundaries, being introduced to the different social groups in question, and persuading them of its veracity and superiority-re-creating in other cultures standard ized values and tastes arising in the dominant societies. It could be argued that this is a consequence of global ization, understood as the intensification and extension of social relations to a world scale, which generates shared meanings and values (Giddens r99r:691. How ever, we cannot avoid noticing that the general accep tance of this model of reality, which creates in the con sumers of hegemonic culture the false impression of consent or choice, contributes to stigmatization, self· deprecation, and the maintenance of hegemonic power and the status quo in social groups in opposition. Based on the idea of civilization and progress, persuasive cul tural control-at times subliminal-is also coercive. It generates colonized and selectively blind mentalities at the same time that it justifies as civilizing the processes of social control !conquest, genocide, proselytization, exploItation of resources} in "less civilized and progres sive" regions.
Finally, an aspect of ader'g work that interests me because it is evidence of acute self-knowledge is the question why social scientists, especially in hegemonic countries, have such difficulty examining the control ling processes operating within their own societies. I do not expect to provide an unequivocal answer to this question, but I suspect that the discomfort and even dis guSt that arise in scientific communities when the thorny issues of social and cultural control are raised comes from a reluctance to see themselves as objects of control exercised by the ideological apparatuses of the state (Gramsci ] Nader's essay is one of the rare contemporary instances of a theoretical formulation grounded in the anthropo logical tradition; this would in itself be sufficient reason to congratulate ourselves on its appearance in an era in which our discipline seems too ready to forget its his torical trajectory. At the same time it is a work that ex plores and analyzes the presence of cultural mecha nisms that have often gone unnoticed by social analysts. We have here, then, an essay proposing a theo retical formulation that is intended to be a useful ana lytical tool, and I propose to comment on it on both these levels. I would first point out, however, in keeping with certain recent {and not so recent) concerns of the academic community, that the anthropologist is not just an author but also an interested reader; therefore my reading of the essay is not the only one possible, and in it will be apparent my interest in linking it to the analysis of the ethnic question in Latin America, a theme to which I have devoted my professional career.
The study of the processes of cultural control and their dramatic linkage to power is a venerable concern in anthropology, expressed in the early preoccupation of Malinowski with symbols situated outside formal sys tems of control. The coercive capacity of these symbols lies not in their institutional character but in their deep internalization by members of a society. They form part of what Berger and Luckmann 1]968) have called "the constituted real"-part of the structure of plausibility of a nomos, a culturally constructed order of meaning but presenting itself as self-evident and consistent with the nonnative order the particular society that gener ates it. In this sense it would not be inappropriate to recall Durkheim's concept of "mechanical solidarity," conceived as a shared state of consciousness. The idea of this kind of solidarity might help us to understand the mechanisms of symbolic power-the capacity of cultural symbols to become embodied in the structures of societies and to orient their collective behaviors. Within this perspective the ethnographic examples of fered bere, especially that of aesthetic medicine and tbe notion of physical beauty, are clear.
Even the essay under discussion may not, however, be free of the mechanisms inherent in tbe controlling processes it analyzes and the "coercive harmony" that they generate. Nader is a distinguished representative of U.S. anthropology, an academic tradition with a certain tendency to feed on itself and consciously or uncon sciously to exclude the traditions of other countries, es pecially those that have been considered more as ob jects than as subjects of professional practice. Tbus the coherence and historical legitimacy of this anthropol ogy are based on an appeal to its own trajectory and ex ponents. In this sense it is configured as a discourse of academic power whose community of protagonists is also involved in coercion aimed at a certain collective harmony based on participation in a unitary discourse. I base these observations on the absence in this essay of references to works by Latin American authors that might have contributed to the variety and richness of its analysis such as the theory of cultural control pro posed by the Mexican Guillermo Bonfil Batalla (]986), the formulations on cultural production and consump tion advanced by the Argentine Nestor Garcia CancIini (19901, and the notes of such Brazilian colleagues as Roberto Cardoso de Oliveira (r976) on interethnic ideo logical configurations, Renato Ortiz (]9801 on popular cultures, and Gilberto Velho {t9871 on complex socie ties. All these works contain important reflections on hegemonic ideological configurations and the cultural control mechanisms that they entail. It is worth men tioning that despite the citation of Gramsci there is no reference to such neo-Gramscian Italian anthropolo gists as L. M. Lombardi Satriani (]973, t974), whose work can be considered a classic study of the processes of articulation between dominant and subaltern cul tures that further illuminates the power relations in volved in controlling processes.
Finally, it may be pointed OUt that Nader's concep tual construction is valid for the analysis of contempo rary ethnic processes. One of the characteristics of pres ent-day neocolonial contexts in Latin America arises from the configuration of 'Icoercive harmonies" whose expressions assume the legitimacy of situations of po litical and cultural domination and subordination. The internalization of this constituted reality by many in digenous peoples has led them to the cultural suicide that we call ethnocide. The processes of control devel oped by the multiethnic Latin America states, on the assumption that they are uninational formations, have sought to instrumentalize political power in order to re press cultUral diversity. With the emergence of de mands on the part of indigenous peoples, this situation is changing. Thus it is apparent that the consensus gen erated by the manipulation of power is susceptible to transformation based on ideological redefinition and the consequent political practice. Nader has done a superb job of showing how ethno graphic research can reveal some of the ways in which unchallenged hegemonic cultural forms support the wealth and power of economic elites. She addresses the important and challenging question of why people so frequently seem to endorse and participate in cultural patterns that from a different perspective might be counter to their own long-term interest. Surely there are controlling processes at work that convince us that the cultural transfoffilations we experience are inevita ble and involve impersonal forces beyond our control. Or is the system really working for everyone's benefit and in a way that is likely to continue forever?
Nader's example of the rising importance of dispute resolution through mediation aimed at harmony and consensus rather than conflict and justice is a critical reminder of how subtle and persuasive controlling pro cesses can be in a global commercial culture, even as they favor the interests of those in power. I accept her argument that similar harmony approaches were un doubtedly fostered by missionaries and civil authorities who sought to control indigenous groups on the colo nial frontiers. Certainly, as she points out with her Za po tee example, contemporary indigenous groups can use harmony and consensus to fend off state power. However, I suspect that harmony and consensus were already intrinsic features of daily life in autonomous small-scale cultures where they served internal ends. While Nader's perspective has major implications for our understanding of power in global-scale cultures, it also applies to our general understanding of autono mous small-scale cultures and ancient civilizations. For example, as Nader points out, anthropologists may have overemphasized the idea that tribal cultures were har monious systems of belief and practice to which every one happily consented. Certainly in any culture "power holders may manipulate culture to control others." However, there was necessarily much less total social power in small-scale cultures and power was more widely distributed than in either ancient political econ omies or global-scale commercial cultures. Hegemonic power of the Gramsci type could not exist in the ab sence of economic elites or an upper class. Furthermore, where tribal societies were organized as direct democra cies l consensus was less likely to be coercive because all concerned individuals or groups could mediate on relatively equal terms. This could work as long as ev eryone knew who was most powerful and as long as support or consent could be freely given or withheld. NADER 
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Even though hegemonic power in the global culture is by definition seldom resisted because consent is un consciously internalized in the minds of those who are being controlled, there are real human agents directing this power and benefiting from its application. A crucial feature of hegemonic power in global-scale commercial cultures is that human agency is virtually invisible. There are powerful economic elites who ultimately di rect the global culture's controlling processes, but they are largely anonymous and their power is difficult to avoid. With a few notable exceptions, the woridis largest individual stockholders, the most powerful CEOs, the most influential corporate directors are not household names. Few people could even name the five largest multinational corporations.
I agree completely with Nader that anthropologists need to study the world of commercial business. It is the source of the most transforming power in the form of finance capital. We also need to look behind the often invisible controlling processes and identify the princi pal corporate owners and directors who are the primary beneficiaries of power. Like Mooney, we need to go to "root causes" and risk offending those who occupy the positions of greatest commercial power. Perhaps the central hegemonic myth of the global culture is our be lief in lithe economyll imagined as an impersonal, irre sistible force and the parallel belief that a perpetually growing economYI as measured by gross domestic prod~ uct l will benefit everyone. In this regard it is not sur prising that the economist Lester C. Thurow (I9961 re cently used the geological principles of plate tectonics to explain how economic forces shape the world. What could be less subject to human control? Are we there fore to think that sweeping cultural transformations in todayls world such as shifting investment to the lowest paid workers are like volcanoes and earthquakes? How ever, I conducted a careful sort of Securities and Ex change Commission filings and found that in 1994, instead of plate tectonics, just ten individuals helped di rect 37 American companies whose combined assets of $2 trillion represented nearly 10 percent of all corporate assets in U.S. for profit businesses. As long as everyone believes that the economy is beyond human control and can grow forever, the elite will be able to resist more equitable redistributive change. When anthropologists studying their own societies still believed that power had a specific center, notions such as ideologyl cultural production l alienation l and false consciousness retained precise meanings, and the an thropologises task was clear. We gave priority to the study of underprivileged groups, and at the heart of our minute descriptions of these groups' practices was an effort to lay bare forms of alienation. As leftist political parties and other more or less organized forms of mak iog revolutions lost their credibility, we also came to realize that power was not a group of institutions that enforced the subservience of citizens but rather a force permeating all realms of social life with no real center and no one to invent power tactics. OUf ethnographies began to be oriented by a series of new notions seeking to revise the concept of alienation. Though we contin· ued to focus on underprivileged groups, at the heart of our minute descriptions of the same manifestations as before was the attempt to show that these manifesta tions were permeated by forms that challenged domina tion. Drawing inspiration from Gramsci, we focused on the resistance strategies that organized social practices among the popular sectors. Thus we produced a new kind of romantic view of popular culture in which power, counterhegemony, and resistance are central an alytical categories. However, insofar as these categories are used pervasively to approach all domains of social life in the same way, they run the risk of becoming empty concepts.
Nader's text is welcome in that it proposes a method for approaching the study of power. Her distinction be tween social control and cultural control is already broadly accepted when it comes to discussing hege mony. Nevertheless, the way she works with control ling processes and especially her ethnographic examples lead us to the analysis of the specific forms that power takes on and point out the traps it sets for practices in tent upon contesting it.
In discussing different types of controlling processes, Nader revives Mintz's legacy and reintroduces the per spective gained from "studying up," showing the suit ability of anthIopology for the study of a society in which freedom of choice constitutes a supreme value and, at the same time, harmony rather than justice is desirable-in short, a society that has an aversion to formal mechanisms for institutionalizing conflict. I shall discuss her three ethnographic examples in order to call attention to contributions of her article to cul ture-and-politics studies here in the other hemisphere of America (where her writings are required reading), but I also intend to point out the directions in which her argument has been carried.
The idea that alternative dispute resolution, created to enhance access to justice, ironically leads to coercive consensus has redirected our attention to the ongoing liberal-communitarian debate, which provides an orien tation for current reflections on justice and rights in contemporary Western societies. It is especially impor tant to recognize that, while defending an increasingly dense conceptualization of democracy and justice, the so-called political minorities, imbued with communi tarianism, paradoxically tend to value coercive har mony and restrict the possibility of a critical stance, confrontation, and choice in relations between commu nities and especially within communities themselves.
Shedding light on the coercive elements of communi tarian ideologies is especially important in the North American context, where the currently prevailing ideals of justice and democracy find a society in which minori ties, proud of their own particularities, live together somewhat harmoniously. In Brazil and in Western Eu ropean countries, obviously for different reasons, the is sues of poverty and discrimination-both racial and sexual-pose a different set of problems. The prevailing Brazilian discourse on integration and assimilation has produced the image of a just and democratic society, rendering any differences except those based on eco nomic inequality inelevant. In the Brazilian context, where American political values tend to emerge as counterhegemonic alternatives, it becomes very impor tant to relativize com.munitarian ideals, with special re gard for the dangers of coercive consensus.
To deal with the body and with new body technolo gies is to challenge the liberal side of this debate. When ascribed body qualities are regarded as pure plasticity, ader invites anthropologists to go beyond the study of representations of the body or of the body as a passive receptacle of power and to take on the study of the em bodiment processes that characterize contemporary practices. However, it is not enough to say that we need to relativize the idea of free choice by pointing out the boundaries involved in the choices we believe we are making freely. We must take into account the dilem mas facing a society that condemns us to a life of choices that we cannot run away from. The body's qual ities are no longer perceived as natural and unchange able, and individuals are persuaded to assume responsi bility for their own appearance, health, and well-being through disciplined body work and the use of new tech nology. The idea that illnesses aIe self·inflicted, re sulting from abuses such as drinking, smoking, and lack of exercise, leads us to be constantly vigilant of our bod ies. Illnesses} wrinkles} and sagging flesh are trans· formed into signs of moral laxity to be resisted by ener getic body maintenance with the help of the cosmetic fitness and health industries, whose main argument is that deterioration and decline are the results of the indi vidual's bodily neglect. It therefore becomes imperative for us to question how prevailing sell-preservationist conceptions of the body combine with the liberal free dom-of-choice model, redefining public policy, intensi fying social hierarchies, and making individuals respon sible for their own misery and suffering.
In discussing science, then, it is not sufficient simply to assert that scientists do not possess their alleged sci entific neutrality or that anthropologists are prisoners of their own societies' ideological constraints; one must also analyze how the meanings that scientists produce affect and redirect in different ways our own day-to-day existence as well as that of the groups that anthropolo gists traditionally have studied. The potential of anthro pological research has barely been tapped in its analysis of conflict and disputes between dominant groups seek ing to monopolize and stabilize hierarchies or in its de scription of the ways in which the powerful organize their world of meanings and of the world in which these meanings gain significance. It becomes imperative to politicize the discussion in domains that because they are not configured politically offer certain agents the op portunity to exercise a sort of metapolitical mandate. These agents, under the guise of scientific neutrality or freedom of choice, vehemently reaCt to any attempt to politicize their spheres of action.
In placing culture at the center of the study of power and in demonstrating the precariousness of anthropolo gists' knowledge about their own society, Nader ex pands our horizons towards a new program of empirical research. Examining the ways in which justice, the body, and science are currently undergoing reconfigu ration represents a propitious start. 
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This is an ambitious attempt to deal with an extremely slippery concept but one that all social scientists use implicitly though they may avoid the word. "Power ll is what Nader wants to understand. She conceives it as a force that is invisible rather than embodied in specific figures of authority or particular sanctions, an object achieved in "unequal relationshipslI by processes of "in cremental control.
lI She illustrates her approach with three kinds of events: Ir )a shift in the processes for deal ing with disputes from law court to negotiated settle ment, j2.) the perfonnance of cosmetic surgery on women, and (3) museum presentation of "science" to the lay public. My first reaction is one of sympathy with the political position that informs her analysis. Then I ask myself how the three kinds of events are to be com pared. These manifestations of inequality are variable even within categories. Cases of dispute settlement range from domestic conflict to international confron tations over water rights. Nader has shown in the Zapo tee highlands of Mexico that negotiated forms of dis pute settlement-"hannony ideology"-may enable local communities to preserve their autonomy and re sist intervention by central government, but in her analysis of the "global shift" away from litigation (in which justice should be seen to be done) to negotiation (in which the powerful can invisibly pressure the weak) she seems to assume that IIhannony ideology" always favors the imposition of the strong. One could argue that much litigation in courts is equally biased and dis advantageous to the weak. In a similarly panoramic view, the women who surgically modify their body shapes 3re seen as the victims of a "body beautiful" myth peddled in the U.S.A. by a combination of adver tising for the multimillion-dollar beauty industry and a greedy medical establishment. Without denying the strength of these predatOry groups, is it possible that the motivation of some women and the uses made of the industry might serve other kinds of empowerment? In the final set of examples, a museum concerned to illus-NADER Controlling Processes 1727 trate both positive and negative aspects of scientific ac tivity runs into deep trouble with a large corporation that funded its exhibition and provokes indignation from those who wish to present a purely positive view of science. Other museums run into trouble with other custodians of esoteric knowledge/artifacts. The line be tween powerful and powerless seems most blurred in this set of examples. The political clout of popular com munity activists, pressure exerted by a multinational corporation, and the opinion of some scientists seem only to be sociologically analogous in that they all can cause problems for the museum curator-which tells us more about the vulnerability of curators than about the power exercised by their critics. What is most attractive about Nader's analysis is that she is dealing with serious political issues in the world we inhabit and encouraging anthropologists to make relevant statements about those issues. I am not con vinced that a wide-ranging definition of "power ll is helpful. The presentation of more data in anyone of the categories she has chosen to exemplify her argument and a detailed demonstra tion of how the processes of "incremental control" work in specific cases would make the analysis more persuasive and useful. But whatever flaws there may be in her argument, Nader is to be congratulated for confronting a major theoretical problem and reminding us that what is happening in our own political system should also be grist to our mill. 
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In r972 Nader made a celebrated appeal 10 anthropolo gists to analyze the workings of power in their own so ciety by "studying up.II In the present article, situating her approach to an anthropology of power within a broader genealogy of anthropology, she expands the force of her original appeal by showing its continuing relevance and by elaborating on its theoretical under pinnings.
Briefly, those theoretical underpinnings consist of a broadly Gramscian form of marxist analysis inflected by Foucault's writings on power. Nader borrows from Marx a technique of analysis that emphasizes the illu sory nature of certain choices lhere, the choice to have breast augmentation or settle for dispute resolution; in Marx, the choice to sell one's laborJ when these choices, though presented as free, are constrained and coerced. From the Gramscian tradition she borrows a focus on hegemony-decentered and uneven processes of ideo logical domination that naturalize the workings of power. Nader blends this marxist perspective with a Foucauldian impulse to critique the authority of ex perts, to challenge liberal narratives of progress, and to emphasize the multiple sites through which power cir, culates and from which it originates.
In this comment, writing as an anthropologist of sci· eoce, I will discuss Nader's treatment of breast augmen· ration and the Smithsonian exhibit-her second and third case studies. I believe it is no coincidence that twO of the three case studies in this article concern scien tists, while Nader's 1972 article on studying up made little reference to science as a site of power. As the " cul· ture wars ll give way to the "science wars" [Ross 1996 ), the world-uansforming power of capitalism increas· ingly depends on the leveraging of science and technol ogy, the power of technoscience misused to hatnl the environment irrevocably or end human life is clear, new medical and computing technologies are integrated into the routine daily practices of the self, and news stories that begin "Scientists say
." are part of the white noise of public discourse. In other words, science is an integral part of our society's hegemonic project. Its technological innovations mediate our social subordi nation, its frontiers shape our desires and fantasies, and its practitioners have inherited the old power of the chUich to decode OUI sufferings and to tell us aUIhorita tively what is and shall be.
As the ideology tha t claims not to be one, science as a social project derives part of its power from its ability to claim objectivity and impartiality. Nader counters these claims by showing the ways in which science is a cultural project allied to particular interests and ide ologies in society, but she does this in a Gramscian rather than postmodemist vein-that is, without get ting mired in the constructivist debates about scientific knowledge that have recently produced such a backlash (Gross and Levitt 1994, Sakal 1996) . In her discussion of breast augmentation she shows how expert medical discourses work in alliance with "the beauty-industrial complex" and patriarchal fantasies of the womanly body to reshape the subjectivity of women and to rede fine healrh and normality in ways that may have irrepa rably damaged the bodies of thousands of women. In her discussion of the "Science in American Life" exhibit at the Smithsonian she uses the controversy produced by this unconventional exhibit to highlight our museums' usual construction of scientists as unproblematic au thority figures whose achievements constitute the dot ted lines of progress narratives. Her analysis, using an Ihropology's comparative mel hod, works throughout to reframe the familiar so that we see it anew. Breast aug mentation looks different once resituated as a neighbor to female circumcision, and the rhetoric of traditional science museums seems less friendly once one recog nizes its affinity with older hierarchical representations of the savage other.
Nader's article does suggest two questions. First, what other issues might profit from a similar analysis? Controlling processes that draw on the authority of sci ence can be found among cigarette companies, the alter· native healing industry, corporate polluters, and phar maceutical companies, to name a few. For example, in an era when U.S. pharmaceutical executives are saying that one-third of the world's population may be taking psychiatric medication within two decades jHarper's In dex 19971, current attempts to redefine previously nor mal moods and behaviors as disorders cry out for an· thropological analysis.
Second, although Nader te:ls us that "sometimes peo ple achieve power, rather than being made increasingly powerless," she does not systematically theorize how this happens. In the final analysis, in addition to under standing how controlling processes work, we need to know how to subvert and unravel them.
ELLEN HERTZ
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/lIt is in the United States," observes French anthropol ogist Denys Cuche, "that the concept of culture was to receive its warmest welcome, and in North American anthropology its most lemarkable theoretical develop ment. In this particular scientific context, research on the question of culture and cultures has developed in a genuinely cumulative and uninterrupted fashion" (r996:39). In commenting on Nader's study of "control ling processes," it is helphtl to begin by situating her within this particular scientific contextj indeed, were it her style, Nader could make a strong claim for member ship in cultural anthropology's most aristocratic lin eage, descending as she does in a direct line from Boas through Benedict, Sapil, and Mead to Kluckhohn. Read ing Nader's place in the American anthropological tra dition is instructive both for the light it sheds on the histOry of the discipline and for the hints it provides as to the discipline'S links with the competing multi-disci pline of cultural studies.
From its beginnings, the study of culture in American anthropology has had a critical edge, although, as Mar cus and Fischer (19861 demonstrate, Ihe form and force of this criticism have varied enormously. Boas self·con sciously opposed the term Itculture" to the misplaced concept of "race" found in contemporary explanations of difference. Mead focused on the concept of cultule to illustrate the formative effects of group values on indi vidual personality but always with an eye to the role of cultural dissent within American society. Geertz en gages in a kind of cultural criticism when he uses cul tural others to hint at alternative ways of conceiving re ality (1973:1451-However, it is when the notion of culture is examined culturally-when anthropologists begin to look for what is hidden by the concept of cul ture as well as what it illuminates (Hymes 19691 -that the critical promise of cultural anthropology comes of age. Nader's analysis of "cultural control" should be seen as part and parcel of this progressive refinement of critical anthropology's analytic toolkit.
However, this development is not a mere outgrowth of "the discipline." In contemporary American acade mia, Nader's critical cultural anthropology intersects and overlaps with that less venerable (but eminently venerablizable) "body" of thought called cultural stud· ies. Cultural studies share Nader's emphasis on the ideological functions of culture and, more important, her insistence that these functions be viewed dynami· cally: hegemony can be harnessed to counterhegemonic ends just as counterhegemonic currents can be shunted back into the hegemonic mainstream. Cultural studies in their more recent guise also share Nader's interest in what Sapir labeled "traveling ideologies," systems of thought and values rhat cross and challenge national boundaries in the form of material objects, technolo gies, institutions, and cultural productions. An impor tant question, then (one that I can only ask, not answer here I, is what motivates and sustains this confluence of interests and emphases. I am certainly not the first to notice that the sudden concentration on "culture" in the academy has itself many of the markings of a con· rrolling process. We should ask what each srream of thought tells us about the other and what both are "do ing" on and/or to the American academic scene.
In this interrogation, we will find, I think, that Nad er's grounded analyses frequently send us in more fruit ful directions than the various approaches found in cul tural studies. The examples of controlling processes which Nader examines in her article alert us to certain defining moments in the process of cultural controL (I) sudden and undiscussed changes in discourse para· digms, (2) the recombination of allies and enemies along new battle lines, with consequently strange bedfel lowships, and, perhaps most characteristic, 13) the stig matization and radical exclusion of one position in what should rightly be considered a debate. While each of these elements can be detected in the odor of blitz krieg that surrounds the arrival of cultural studies in the United States. I will discuss only the last of them here, for it is the most paradoxical.
At first sight, nothing could be more foreign to cul tural studies as a movement than the radical exclusion of anything whatsoever. But that is precisely the point. Within the cultural studies movement, Ilmultiple per spectives" is a principle, a starting point, not an obser vation or a conclusion. And the one "perspective" it must exclude is that according to which we can deter mine once and for all what a given cultural phenome non is really all about. (By way of contrast, in her analy. sis of "harmony ideology" Nader presumes that it is possible to clistinguish harmony "genuine and spuri ous."l But-and this is paradox number two-the radi cal stigmatization of "univocality" in cultural studies, far from encouraging a variety of "voices," appears in fact to stifle debate, for if one is not amidst the circles of the initiated it is frequently impossible to know what to debate against. For reasons that were originally com mendable la principled concern about cultural domina tIonl, practitioners of cultural studies uphold a series of rules governing hOWl in ader's terms, "the thought ful" are allowed to speak for "the destitute." ader does not imagine that she is speaking for others, dominant or dominatedj rather, she sees herself as drawing con clusions from observations and critical reflection. Con-NADER Controlling Processes 1729 elusions ventured are conclusions with which others remain free to disagree. Thus-paradox number three Nader's empiricism more adequately allows for the pas· sibility that "the destitute" and lithe thoughtful" might, on some occasions l actually be the same people and that they can speak for themselves. Medicine, McGill University, Montreal, Que., Canada H] 
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Writing in the 1980s, the literary critic Terry Eagleron insisted that we are /lin the process of wakening from the nightmare of modernity, with its manipulative rea son and fetish of the totality." In making this claim he joined forces with those who argued that grandiose meta-narratives had to be jettisoned together with be liefs in progress and absolute truths. In their place would be the "laid·back pluralism of the postmodem" and a denunciation of the IInostalgic urge" (19871. A de~ cade larer, Nader's rhoughtful paper, designed to pro· vide a methodology for the study of power, shows us clearly that, far from being laid-back, our era is one in which the forces of the modern persist unabated; the urge for control, whether it be for economic or symbolic gain, is clearly evident across the domains of law, sci ence, and body polities. Nader seeks to expose certain of the controlling processes present in the United States today-less visible than formerly, no doubt, but never theless powerfully present ro the discerning eye as natu· ralized forces continually at work. Explicitly following Mintz's lead, Nader argues for an anthropology of every day life, one that reveals potential sites of dispute in which competing values are mobilized as power ploys. More striking l however, is the damping down of possi. ble dissonance through the hegemonic power of scien tific and legal institutions and cliscourse and an associ ated ethics of practice dominated, in the case of body politics, by an ethos of rational choice and, in law, by a form of dispute resolution that Nader characterizes as coercive harmony.
Paradoxically, anthropology in its study of the Other has a history of parochialism. Extensive research from the 1960s on in connection with Japan, often character ized as the first country beyond the Euro/American axis to "modemize/' showed indisputably that convergence theories of modernization were inappropriate (Austin 19761. evertheless, this research, soon vastly aug mented by accounts from other arenas in the "devel oping" world, did little to decenter a belief in the "West" as dispensing modernity to the non-Western world. The Comaroffs 119931 have nored that one virtue of a recent preoccupation with "postmodemity" has been that it has forced us to recognize the ideological and profoundly historical aspects of modernity. Increas ingly there is a recognition of the many modernities, all active participants in the global economYj the dichoto· mous opposition of tradition/modernity with its associ ated nostalgia is now firmly pried open. It is in this climate that Nader/ among a growing number of anthro pologists/ has turned to the cultural hegemonies at work in the United States and other "developed" sites. The West is finally exoticized, just a little.
One of the pervasive myths of our times is, of course/ that science is epistemologically free-that its truth claims transcend human agency and therefore by defi nition issues of power are not involved in the produc tion of scientific knowledge or in its practice. Current vituperative debates epitomized by a recent exchange in the New York Review of Books about the "hoax" that Alan Sokal perpetrated by having a sham scientific arti cle reviewed and published in Social Text Isee Weinberg I996) reveal major fissures in our beliefs about science. It does not take a cultural analysis to demonstrate that science and its associated technologies are integral to the perpetuation of global inequalities or that, for exam ple, pharmaceutical companies directly inflict misery on many peoples of the world through greed and decep tion (a combination of bad science and false advertis ing). But a cultural analysis/ as opposed to a discourse analysis, as Nader points out, permits us to unmask "non-agentive" forms of power (Comaroff and Comaroff 19911. Yanagisako and Delaney (19951 encourage us to look at the intersections of discourses as they are acted out in daily life, to work across domains, but without assuming a coherence to culture. It is then possible to comprehend, for example, if indeed the widely touted values of health as virtue, bodily control, informed choice, and autonomous decision making, to name a few, all currently fostered in both political and biomedi cal discourse, are indeed as hegemonic as we believe them to be. An anthropology of body politics suggests othenvise and reveals that women's responses to a ,,,,,hole range of biomedical technologies are motivated primarily by a pragmatism in which they seek to fulfill desired reproductive and health-related objectives (Lock and Kaufert r9971. Behavior appears to be remarkably unhampered by values embedded in medical discourse/ and medical technologies are often made use of merely to facilitate culturally motivated goals. That which is naturalized/ the taken-for-granted, must be exposed be fore the dialectics of domination and resistance come into play, but neither theories of unwitting compliance nor "theories of mindful resistance to dominant ideolo gies provide much explanatory power. Anthropologists must insist on complexity, thus challenging the hegem ony of simplification/ a powerful form of incremental control at work in society today. Anthropology, City College, r38th St. and Convent Ave., New York, N.Y ID03r, U.S.A. 4 VI 97 The analysis of power and how it operates in society, central to the critique of anthropology in the 1970S and 19805/ was derailed with the tum to issues of individual empuwerment as the involution of anthropology pro gressed into the 1990S. Armed with advances by Sidney Mintz in the analysis of material culture and its manip ulation and by Foucault in selected aspects of discourse analysis, Nader has revitalized the issues of power. Her approach to analyzing cultural conditioning by control· ling agencies adds depth and range to the cross-cultural study of power relations. In contrast to the social-con trol model that dominated discussions of power in ear lier decades, she addresses the issue of how versions of truth become accepted in culture and how these serve particular interests. Juxtaposing three disparate types of control-the harmony model in law courts/ the "free choice" model in consumption circles, and the ideal ized version of science in museology-she questions processes that are usually assumed in the master narra tives of structuralism yet are the very stuff of hege monic accord. Class conflict is part of the picture, nei ther dominating nor yielding to the discourse of cultural control.
JUNE NASH
Department of
No anthropologist is mOle adept than Nader in locat ing the controlling process by which power is translated into behavioral norms. Her life work has been dedicated to showing how these institutionalized norms reinforce power structures as people engage in or resist their own domination. From law courts to government bureaucra cies to consumer complaint departments she has ex plored the frustrations of plaintiffs/ defendants, clients, and consumers as they wend their way in the mazeways of their own culture in search of justice.
In "Controlling Processes/' Nader grounds her analy sis of power in three settings: law, medicine, and ffiuse ology/ in which vulnerable populations encounter ideas, institutions, and agencies that become infonnalized in their behavioral repertoire. In each setting the {'hidden persuaders" (to use a cliche first decoded in advertising media) of coercive harmony in law/ of choice in medi· cine, and of mystification in science work indirectly to achieve ends that are not always imagined by the actors.
The most convincing model of coercion comes from Nader's long-standing interest in legal processes. Mov ing from Zapotec law courts, where she envisions colo nial missionary programs emphasizing conciliation and compromise, to alternative dispute resolution, she shows how the 1960s critique of social injustice was de fused with concerns of order and the courtS, under the guidance of Chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court Warren Burger/ moved toward control of the disenfran chised. She follows this theme of controlling processes in the Indian reservations' acceptance of nuclear waste, the quality-control plants in which workers and manag ers cooperate in harmony, and finally international dis pute settlement. Her approach enables one to penetrate the screens that mystify power relations in the field. I have seen one aspect of harmony work at the Pittsfield General Electric Plant, where I did fieldwork in the 1980s. The growing dissatisfaction with the organiza tion of work in missile and "defense" production and the anxiety created by massive layoffs in "peacetime" power-transfonner production were diffused by quality· control circles that sabotaged the grievance machinery Nader calls upon ethnographers to define more clearly who benefits ftom harmonizing disputes. How do culturally accepted norms modify behavior appar ently structured on class premises? Our fieldwork expe riences indicate the subtlety of these constraints in ways that have not easily fit into the master paradigms. I recall a work stoppage on Mother's Day in the Bolivian tin-mining community of Oruro when an irate and troubled workforce had cornered the management in a demand for improved technology to enhance produc tion la strange reversal of worker/managerial responsi bilities in itself). The anger of the workers was mollified by a joke interposed in the heated discourse by an adroit manager. Diverting the call for upgrading production that was the thrust of the workers' grievance, he said, "Let's talk about conditions of work: we have just inau gurated a new wing to the hospital and added an obste· trician to the staff-you know, he's the man who makes a living sticking his hand up women's vaginas." When the workers laughed at this male hegemonic ploy, I knew the strike was lost.
Complexity is indeed the leitmotif of an analysis of the relationship between power and cultural control. Shifting to the apparently trivial domain of how power operates in the body-enhancement syndrome, Nader shows how feminine "choices" contrive to entrap women in a manufactured consensus of beauty. Here the question of whose power is enhanced is more sa lient than in the case of legal structures and the ideol ogy of harmony. Nader tells us that the same cultural control system may offer hannony across class lines. Is it female subordination when we confront a beauty in dustry in which female as well as male corporate ex ecutives profit? Are upper-class women even more vic timized by the lure of liposuction and face-lifts than lower-class ones simply because of their greater dispos able income? Or is there a glass ceiling beyond which extremely wealthy women do not have to confoml to canons of beauty put in place for the strivers? Clearly class differences in definitions of female beauty and consumers cannOt easily be decoded from advertise ments for medical procedures. Inherited wealth may re lieve even women of the need and desire to be sexually attractive. The normative approach taken by Nader to this phenomenon falters in coming to grips with the cultural-to-structural leap she handles so spiritedly in her analysis of the hannony model in law, but it clears the path for further breakthroughs as we gain more in sight into these contested arenas of culturally defined behaviors.
The link between power and culture is even more dif fuse in the case of the new museology and science. Fifty years ago museums served a power structure in their In detailing the move from social control to cultural control, Nader enhances our awareness of the multiple dimensions of control as consensual and consensus as control. Drawing from both Gramsci and Foucault to develop the shift from conrrol over groups or relation ships to control over mind, she shows the strengths and gaps in each. While Gramsci provides a sense of how certain classes may manage to universalize their beliefs and values, Foucault describes the many devious paths by which they become accepted as ttuth. The article is, indeed, a coup that enables us to count the advances of ethnographic theory and method.
Just as some structuralists neglected the strictures of cultural control, those who like to situate themselves in the never-never land of cultural abstractions have ne glected the channeling conditions provided by socially constituted structures of control. Hewing to the histori cal materialism of Sidney Mintz, Eric Wolf, and those who set the pace for reediting anthropology in the 1970S1 Nader has charted a new course that brings the anthropology of everyday life back into the center of a stage that has been bereft of people, things, and the stuff of culture. Ghent, Ghent, Belgium. 7 IV 97 Nader has managed to sketch a shift in the power bal ance within Western societies: we are "enculturatedl' to become more and more controlled. The analysis is in spiring and persuasive. I propose two further elabora tions:
RIK PINXTEN
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I capitalism, the social sciences, neoconservatism, and psychotherapy, which he argues are all based on "cer tainties" as rigid and narrow as those doggedly held by the Jacobins, Bolsheviks, and Fascists. These authors, as well as the commentators on my paper, are also reach ing for an understanding of the means by which ide ologies, as distinct from other forms of culture, create patterns of subordination and conformity. The com mentators also point to the problems in studying such phenomena. For example, Barabas asks why social scientists have such difficulty examining the controlling processes op erating within their own society. Is it a reluctance to see themselves as objects of control and reproducers of hegemony? She argues that the paradigm of cultural su periority (what Edwatd Said [1978} eatliet called posi tional superiority) blinds mentalities while justifying as civilizing the processes of controL Deben questions the suitability of anthropology for the study of a society in which freedom of choice is so highly valued that it is difficult to politicize the discussion in domains that are not configured politically. Hertz zeroes in on a key dif· ficulty for the anthropologist, the contemporary stigma tization of univocality that makes one unable to take a position. There is challenge, she says, "when the notion of culture is examined culturally-when anthropolo gists begin to look fat what is hidden by the concept of culture as well as what it illuminates." Only by so do ing can we unmask the nonagentive forms of power that Lock assigns to the belief that the West is dispensing modernity to the non· Western world. In spite of the rec ognition of many modernities, powerful organizations like the World Bank ot the IMF operate with only one, as in the colonial penod, with the West still dispensing civilization.
Yet other kinds of difficulties are articulared by Drucker-Brown, whose position is similar to the notion that respect for work within residential boundaries nec essarily makes the work berrer. Although Drucker Brown remains unconvinced that a wide-ranging defi nition of "power" is helpful, Oebert reminds us why it is. Excellent ethnographic work in anthropology made us realize that power did not have a specific center in a group of institutions that enforced citizen subordina tion-that it was also a fluid force permeating all as pects of social life. We have learned to look at ideology and cultural production empirically. And, as Bodley reo iterates, we had to look at hegemonic power in global scale commercial cultures, where human agency is vir tually invisible. Conrrol indeed has multiple dimen sions and different forms-centralized, implicit, direct democracy, and the dimensions found within social groups-but we have moved from a model of static so cial control to a model that recognizes the fluidity of an entrepreneurial kind of power, "street smarts."
The beauty of rhis kind of work is that it generates new perspectives on questions that anthropologists have long struggled with. Bartolome wants to know what the underlying processes are that produce ethno cide. Bodley's concern is with Itinevitability," a concept that dovetails with Bartolome's recognition of the inev itability syndrome as a means by which cultural trans formations are sold. The inevitability syndrome is linked with the hegemonic myth of global culture whereby lithe economy" is imagined as impersonal. De bert alludes to the relation between a life of choice and a body no longer perceived as natural and unchangeable, an ideology of choice and the idea that victims are re sponsible for their own suffering-an idea related to what Chomsky refers to as "the reversal./I Hertz recog nizes the stifling of debate by the opposition of multiva· cality and univocality in cultural studies and elsewhere, while Lock recognizes the key to propaganda-simpli fication, in an age of bureaucratic entanglements. Pinx ten notes how multiculturalism is being replaced by cultural identity, a destabilization of the social and po litical harmony project. All of these ideas are important. But June ash's example of the Bolivian tin managers' joke that shifted the workers from the management par adigm to rhe male/female paradigm indicates the effec tiveness of conrrolling processes and the fragility of the human mind.
Gusterson is quite right that in my earlier paper on "studying up" I did not yet recognize science as integral to hegemonic goals. Why I do not exactly know, except that I believed that science and technology had no ideol ogy. What disabused me of this notion was more than a decade of research on energy science and technology, in which scientists themselves taught me how to dis tinguish science from something else, such as science as religion. Not all could make such distinctions, but those who could were eloquent, especially in the dozens of letters they wrote me after the publication of "Barri ers to Thinking New abour Energy" (Nader r98r). I was analyzing conrrolling processes in the energy field: con servation is feminine, nuclear is macho, solar is not in tellectually challenging, and other notions of the "inev itability" of the growth syndrome. Interestingly, my support structure did not emanate from contemporary sociocultural anthropology but from figures like A. L. Kroeber, who analyzed progress as an idea akin to reli gion, and R. Heizer, an archaeological anthropologist who dealt with the significance of technology and knowledge in general over thousand-year time spans.
Some years ago, after a provocative talk on the human dimensions of breeder reactor technology, a distin guished Brazilian nuclear physicist came up to the po dium and said to me, "Yesterday I was lonely. Today I am not lonely." I muSt confess that that is the way I feel after reading these comments. Nash perceives the problem-there has been a derailing and an involution in anthropology. Why is something I have been trying to figure out ( ader t9971, but I srill do not completely understand how we came to move away from our em pirical strength just when we needed a critical method ology to link cultural control with centers of power ac cumulation. Just as many, politicized by the cold war and a glimmer of what colonialism was about, were be ginning to examine the processes by which power is translated into behavioral norms, just as indirect con trol over groups and relationships by control of the mind was gathering momentum came this fogging pro cess, this delight in the abstract. I sometimes refer to the cultural critique movement as epistemological radi calism. I was inspired by the confusion of my students, oscillating between paranoia and IItrustanoia"-be tween thinking that someone is Ollt to get us when no one is and thinking that someone is taking care of us when no one is. Somewhere in between lay some kind of empirical reality that called for the ethnographic study of controlling processes.
Although I cannot do justice to all the stimulus in the comments, I would like to respond to the interest in the interaction between harmony, choice, and science. As Bodley reminds us/ belief in the economy as an imper sonal, irresistible force that will benefit all is a powerful cover for the specific observations indicating that a few actors are driving the machine. The idea of rational eco nomic actors l maximizing their utility by free choice among alternatives forms the core of a premise that all private choices are free of coercion. In the Chicago School version of law and economics, only the state is coercive, not the market-a belief that contributes to the maintenance of hegemonic power not only in the general population but also among anthropologists. Fur ther, the Chicago School's version of law and econom ics declares that courts imposing liability awards inter fere with free choice, and so they move to delegalize.
Earlier conservative legal theorists argued that the common law is a counterpart to the market and its rules should follow market rules. Hence the common law in this earlier view is superior to regulation. My point is that instrumental theorists feel free to choose between couns, regulation, and alternative informal systems de pending on what they are trying to achieve. lt is a dy namic "street smarts" that we are grasping.
The idea of harmony in the contemporary United States today is publicly aligned with peace. In this model there is no U.S. conception of an alternative to harmony that is not divisive. Democracy becomes har mony while debate is contentious, even antidemo cratic. This is what Lock refers to as a dampening down of possible dissonance and what I have called a flat tening process. Again, because lines of power are blurred, context and complexity are critical compo nents. The dynamics help us to understand when con sensus is useful, when confrontation is of the essence, as with the I'wild" capitalism moving in Pinxten's Eu rope, and for whom.
If fluidity is of utmost importance, so too is Debert's notion of subject matter that is not configured politi cally. She speaks of communitarian ideals that travel across borders as if they were not political. In an article in Mother lones ID'Antotllo 19941 the discussants on "I or We" rarely questioned the processes of the master narratives. Only Chomsky got to the control point: "Community ... [wasJ designed in the '930S by the cor porations, when they became terrified by the collapse of their society brought on by the Wagner Act and the labor movement. They developed new techniques to control the population and inculcate the concept of liv ing together in harmony-all Americans. . . . And Them-the outsiders trying to disrupt." So the fine analysis that Drucker-Brown calls for would indeed re quire that we identify different kinds of harmony, dis tinguishing what I have called organic harmony [bam raising and all thatl from the selling of a political idea communitarianism-favoring the traditional family, moral instruction in school, and crime control policies that would limit some of our rights. As critics have pointed out, Americans felt a strong sense of commu nity when they put American-Japanese in concentration camps in the I 940s. Of course such ideologies are double edged and have multiple uses, which is my point as well as Pinxten's in his sharply underlined example of the two faces of Christianity-love thy neighbor and holy war.
In the breast implant case the double edge is complex. There are those who argue that for some women breast implants are empowering, their pragmatic response to everyday life. Indeed these women are empowered, as the saying goes, to roam in a four-cornered cage of someone else's design. Should they have that choice? The answer to that question would embroil us in issues of informed consent, truth in advertising.. truth in sci ence. But the issue for ethnographers is description of the processes by which, as Nash notes, power is trans lated into behavioral norms stigmatizing people, mak ing them responsible for their cosmetic bodies or their emotions-which become sites of moral laxity or vigi lance. The potential for anthropological research has barely been tapped, because the transfonning powers of commerce or unregulated capitalism are too infre quenrly configured politically.
Finally, several of the comments speak about the fu ture, about the potential of politically configuring the mundane or "normal," of an anthropology of everyday life that is not "bereft of people, things, and the stuff of culture" (Nash!. Yet, it is Gusterson's two closing ques tions that stop me in my tracks. They are specific: Which other issues might profit from a similar analysis? And how do we theorize how people achieve power from powerless positions? The example he cites in rela tion to the first question-that of pharmaceutical exec urives predicting that one-third of the world's popula tion may be taking psychiatric medication within two decades-is arresting. The final colonization is the col onization of the mind, and I would give this area top priority as a research question for anthropologists be cause cultural control plays such a central role in this movement. The redefinition of previously IInormal" moods and behavior as disorders is an area that some of the commentators have researched, and although in creasingly of interest it does not yet constitute a re search focus in anthropology such as, for example, gen der studies. Think of it: This is the biological era, and some anthropology departments are phasing out biology and/or research questions relating to biology. Here is where we need to analyze the premises-the culture, if you will-of anthropology as we proceed and in order to proceed.
Another area that cries out for anthropological analy sis is the "many modernities" that Lock speaks about.
The U.S. military was able to decimate an !tagi popula tion in the name of the backwardness of that popula tion, with special reference to the Arab treatment of Arab women-a view that gave us the moral right to bomb innocent women and children in Baghdad. In con gressional hearings I heard the same argument recently vis-a-vis China-"They treat their women like chat tels," The other modernities can often see through these First World tactics better than citizens of the First World who believe. Also, they belong to civilizations older than ours that are still intact, while Westerners commonly deny that there are civilizations in the pIu· ral, each contemporary with the others.
Gusterson's second question about theorizing people achieving power is one we worked on in Energy Choices in a Democratic Society [Nader 198ob ). Since we were writing scenarios for the year 2010} we searched for structural means of empowerment such as increasing self-employment levels to diversify the economic base. We also tried to increase options by decoupling tightly coupled beliefs i here we were getting into questions of mind colonization. Decoupling beliefs such as "less en ergy means less technology" or "big is necessarily bet ter" or "small is necessarily beautiful" touches how people think. One future, for example, was a high technology/low-enetgy one-an impossibility for many participants. We also used scientific standards of evi dence to indicate the role of superstition in high-tech nology thinking} which served to empower the margin alized scientists. In pedagogical terms, knowledge was power. It required lack of confonnity, because those who conformed lost a certain kind of power. The course I teach on controlling processes liberates somei for ex ample, one student said} "At least I know what I'm up against." She had learned how to put the system in re verse. From this angle, how the powerless become em powered is not so different from how the powerful got their power. What is different is the leveraging poten tial, something that is included in the social-movement literature.
For me anthropology is the freest of scientific endeav ors because it potentially does not stop at boundaries that interfere with the capacity of the mind for self-re flection. Ethnography, with all its flaws, has been an in fluential force, and making connections is still an im portant part of what anthropology is about. Making connections is also an increasingly endangered talent as people are moved to know more and more about less and less} thereby creating a parochial anthropology, an other contradiction in terms.
